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ABSTRACT PAGE
Wilmington, Delaware is today the site of the majority of credit card company 
headquarters in the country. A Supreme Court case in 1978 enabled banks to 
"export" the interest rate of the state in which the bank was located to customers 
nationwide. Financial institutions in states with limits on the amount of interest that 
could be charged sought to move to states that were willing to eliminate their usury 
limits. During the same period, Delaware was experiencing a lagging economy, a 
high unemployment rate, and a declining population in its business center 
Wilmington. The state had a long history of business-friendly legislation and its 
governor from 1977-1984, Pierre du Pont, was a descendent of Delaware's wealthiest 
family who owned the DuPont Corporation, the state's largest employer. At the same 
time that financial institutions in New York were looking for a state with less 
financial regulation, Delaware was looking for a new revenue source.
The Delaware law which did both of these things was drafted by the lobbyist for two 
of the nation's largest banks, Chase Manhattan and JP Morgan, and negotiated by a 
handful of Delaware politicians under a shroud of secrecy. What resulted was the 
Financial Center Development Act (FCDA) of 1981, a law favoring corporate 
interests over consumer protections. The state of Delaware gained income and 
increased jobs, but often at the cost of low-income and African American residents. 
Wilmington's skyline sprouted new office towers over the next two decades. The city 
also became ensconced in a web of surveillance and questionable police practices 
arguably aimed at the same Delaware residents largely left out of the state's newfound 
prosperity following the FCDA.
Through audio recordings of the debates over the legislation, media coverage, and the 
parallel histories of the state and the consumer lending industry, a historic drama 
takes shape, which parallels worldwide neoliberal socio-economic turns. The 
implications of this story can also be seen in economic and political circumstances 
today including the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007-8.
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PLASTIC CAPITAL
1
INTRODUCTION
The tenor of the debate on February 3, 1981 on the Delaware Senate floor had 
run the gamut from impassioned and trenchant to dismissive, dissembling, and at 
times downright absurd. Whittling the complexity of the contested banking bill into a 
seminal, philosophical question, Senator Roger A. Martin (D) offered, "What we're 
really trying to do here, is to get in step with the mood in the country these days....but 
really aren't we coming down to the basic question of if you believe in a controlled 
economy [or] one that's [a] so-called free marketplace?"1 His question hung in the 
air. At the end of the day the 131st Assembly recorded more Ayes than Nays, while 
Governor Pierre du Pont listened with aides in his office as the proceedings came 
through loudspeakers. House Bill 28 became law as the "Financial Center 
Development Act," which provided the structure for a new day in the consumer credit 
industry.2
Although some thirty years had passed since the Diner's Club card was 
introduced in 1950 to enable businessmen to conglomerate expenses incurred while 
wining and dining clients, the era of mass-mailed pre-approved cards was yet to
1 Hearing for House Bill 28, Delaware Senate, Legislative Archives, February 3, 1981, audio cd.
2 Larry Nagengast, Pierre S. du Pont IV: Governor o f  Delaware, 1977-1985  (Dover: Delaware 
Heritage Press, 2006), 105-115.
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come.3 The Financial Center Development Act (FCDA) brought that golden era, 
which opened Delaware's doors for banks to enjoy an unprecedented lack of 
regulation and exceptionally low taxes.4
The banks that moved into the physical borders of the state conducted 
business under the laws of Delaware but with customers from across the nation. They 
exported the law of the state, or put another way, they imported virtual customers. 
The blurring of boundaries and the transposition of borders taking place in Delaware 
situated the state outside of itself. Delaware's law made other states' laws irrelevant. 
Even prior to the passage of the act, banks practicing in Delaware enjoyed unique 
freedom, as Senator Harry E. Derrickson (R) described it: "Unlike some other 
states...under Delaware law, unless the law specifically states that something is not 
permitted, it is considered permissible." Well before the FCDA, bank practices in the 
state developed, he summarized, "in this grey area, between the lines of the law so to 
speak."5
Much of the rhetoric leading up to the FCDA was inflected with a sense of 
exigency and grandeur. State official Nathan Hayward urged: "It is for us to seize 
this opportunity," while Senator Orlando J. George, Jr. (D) suggested that the seizing 
needed to be done quickly, because, "The train is leaving and the train has jobs on it." 
John Jay Corrigan, Executive Vice President of the Bank of Delaware called the 
legislation, "critical to the future of our state." The state faced a high unemployment
3 Diners Club International website; Company history;
http://www.dinersclubus.com/dce_content/aboutdinersclub/companyhistory (accessed May 14, 2008).
4 H.B. 28, Del. laws. 801-, February 18, 1981.
5 Delaware Senate, Legislative Archives, Hearing, February 3, 1981, audio cd.
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rate and a deficit that had led Governor du Pont to utter the highly controversial 
statement upon entering office in 1977 that "The state is bankrupt."6 Business leader 
Irving Shapiro who had decried du Pont's bankruptcy charge as hostile to the business 
community, in 1981 sang a different tune, calling the new law "the single most 
important piece of legislation," in the state's history.7
The FCDA helped du Pont balance the state's budget and redeem himself.
And the banks didn't do so badly either. Consumers on the other hand were greeted 
with dozens of credit card offers containing contracts that required a law degree and a 
magnifying glass to comprehend, and by monthly statements with unprecedented 
interest increases and fees.8 The jobs train delivered for some Delawareans (largely 
white collar financial workers), but kept on moving past many who needed them.
In the most recent Fortune 500 ranking, Citibank, Bank of America, and JP 
Morgan were all more profitable than Wal-mart, McDonald's, and Microsoft.9 
Though in existence since the beginning of the twentieth century and in wide use 
since mid-century, credit cards once served primarily as a marketing tool, garnering 
marginal profits until the 1980s.10 Nationwide consumer debt increased by 700
6 Untitled type-written speech, Governor's Papers, du Pont administration, Delaware State Archives, 
1977.
7 Delaware House o f  Representatives, Legislative Archives, Hearing, January 22, 1981, audio cd.
8 Elizabeth Warren: "I teach contract law at Harvard Law School, and [also] commercial law and 
bankruptcy ... but if you put me under oath right now, I tell you, I don't know what the effective 
interest rate w ill be on my credit card next month, because I can't read it in my contract." Frontline, 
Secret H istory o f  the C redit Card. Videocassette (60 min.). (Boston: W GBH Educational Foundation, 
2004).
9 "Fortune 500 2008: Our annual ranking o f America's largest corporations," cnnmoney.com/Fortune 
Magazine online, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/full_list/101_200.html.
10 Lloyd Klein, It's in the Cards: Consumer Credit and the American Experience (Westport: Praeger, 
1997); Lendol Calder, Financing the American Dream : A Cultural H istory o f  Consumer Credit
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percent over the next 15 years. The average household consumer debt in 1980 was 
$518, and in 2003 it was $7519.11
The enactment of the FCDA was a significant factor in the turning tide in 
credit card industry profits. By examining the people, circumstances, and events of 
the FCDA, I aim to show that this turn was not inevitable and, most significant, not a 
natural outgrowth of the free market. The gargantuan nature of the credit industry is 
not simply due to expansion through free market capitalism.
The FCDA came about through secretive dealings between lawmakers and the 
heads of a handful of corporate banks (primarily Chase Manhattan and JP Morgan*). 
The negotiations that enabled radically different terms for credit card consumers was 
drawn up purposefully out of sight of those consumers. Chase and JP Morgan's 
lobbyist wrote the FCDA bill and the credit card industry's army of lobbyists today 
contributes more campaign dollars to candidates on both sides of the aisle than even 
the oil or pharmaceutical industries.12
Why does this matter? In The Great Risk Shift Jacob S. Hacker argues that 
increasing financial insecurity, rising health costs, and decreasing public services
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); George Ritzer, Expressing Am erica: A Critique o f  the 
G lobal Credit Card Society (London: Sage Publications, 1995).
11 David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Paying with Plastic: The D igita l Revolution in Buying 
and Borrowing, 2nd edition (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005), 43; James Lardner, Jose Garcia, and 
Cindy Zeldinup, Up to Our Eyeballs: The Hidden Truths and Consequences o f  D ebt in Today's 
America (New York: New Press, 2008), viii.
Morgan Guaranty is the financial holding company o f JP Morgan Bank. Although it is the holding 
company that moved into Delaware and not the bank per se, I will use the two terms interchangeably, 
as well as the shorthand "Morgan," in the same fashion that others who are quoted here do.
12 "Top Industries Giving to Members o f  Congress, 2008 Cycle," website for Opensecrets. org, The 
Center for Responsive Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/mems.php (accessed May 14, 
2008).
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have diminished the safety net once in place for working Americans. Growing 
economic insecurity eludes scrutiny because "it is so starkly at odds with our nation's 
evident prosperity." Yet many Americans experience economic uncertainty and 
instability—an increased risk of layoffs, decreased retirement funds, and a lack of 
health insurance. Economic risk has shifted from government and corporations onto 
"the increasingly fragile balance sheets of workers and their families."13 This risk 
shift is an ideological change as well as a financial one. Gone is the American ideal 
that hard work can bring financial security, and when disaster strikes, a collective 
safety net kicks in.
Hacker articulates the message implicit in this ideological shift from 
"Someone is watching out for you...when things go bad," to "You are on your own."14 
Heavy credit card use often enters the picture for working and middle class families 
when disaster strikes, such as the loss of a job, a major medical expense, or the loss of 
one of a household's income earners. High interest rates, unlimited fees, and a lack of 
consumer protections—all facilitated by the FCDA—can swiftly plunge people into 
overwhelming debts that can adversely effect their household for many years to 
come.
People use credit cards for an invariably wide range of reasons, of course. We 
live in a consumer culture where just about anything we think of and ten times more 
can be purchased online or off with the right array of digits printed on plastic.
13 Jacob S. Hacker, The Great Risk Shift: The Assault on American Jobs, Families, Health Care, and  
Retirem ent and H ow You Can Fight Back (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), ix.
14 Ibid., x
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Whether it is for entertainment or an emergency, emotional gratification or groceries, 
the consumer credit industry makes its money on those who carry a balance, miss 
payments or spend over their card's limit, and this by and large includes middle or 
lower income working people and college students. Credit card companies increase 
their annual profits by the billions in large part at the expense of those in the lowest 
tax brackets.15 The industry engages in ethically questionable practices with the help 
of lawmakers elected to work on behalf of the American people. As the middle class 
shrinks and the disparity between rich and poor grows, what Hacker calls "a defining 
feature of the contemporary U.S. economy," the need to reflect upon the role of 
public servants on recent economic changes becomes ever greater.16 The policy 
changes that brought the credit card industry to Wilmington are emblematic of 
neoliberal ideology and political shifts that have taken place globally beginning in the 
latter half of the twentieth century, gaining traction during the 1970s and 80s.17
At first glance, the FCDA and the bank revenue it brought to Delaware won 
almost universal praise as an overwhelming success for the state and for the city of 
Wilmington whose skyline was transformed by the addition of bank office towers. 
But upon further examination, not all voices have joined in that chorus. Some of the 
same individuals and families who have been left out of the mythological American 
prosperity over the last several decades found themselves no better off locally at the 
hands of big banks and the local politicians who welcomed them. The city of
15 Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Fragile M iddle Class: 
Am ericans in D ebt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), x.
16 Hacker, ix.
17 David Harvey, A B rief H istory o f  N eoliberalism  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3-10.
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Wilmington is no more than a destination for a credit card bill for many nationwide 
consumers. In opening up the city beyond the cellophane window of an envelope, 
however, a complicated and troubled history emerges. This is the story of the Plastic 
Capital.
CHAPTER I
THE SETUP
As far as the U.S. financial sector was concerned, the 1970s could not end fast 
enough. Rising oil costs, inflation, a weak real estate market among other issues, 
contributed to "stagflation," the buzzword of the decade that indicated inflation 
combined with stagnant business activity. The U.S. economy went through two 
periods of recession during or just prior to the decade. Stagflation and volatile interest 
rates incurred significant losses to some of the nation's largest banks.18 The banking 
industry, and the consumer credit arm specifically, clamored that government 
regulation was the problem, in part because as the cost of money fluctuated, 
regulating caps on interest rates prevented banks from adjusting their rates according 
to the market, or so the argument went. And with different interest rates for each 
state, banks had trouble launching nationwide marketing campaigns.19 Against this 
backdrop national banking law changed, enabling the passage of Delaware's 
precedent-setting Financial Center Development Act that brought Chase Manhattan
and Morgan Guaranty to Wilmington.----------
But why Delaware? To begin with, the state has a long history of amicable 
business laws. It established its incorporation law in 1899 and attempted to attract
18 Evans and Schmalensee, 67.
19 Som e barriers to profit-making were unrelated to fiscal policy and would be smoothed out with 
technological advances in the 1980s and 90s, such as difficulty in preventing credit card fraud and 
processing cumbersome records o f transactions; Ibid., 73.
9
businesses away from the few other states that endowed corporate charters. The 
state's 215 year-old Court of Chancery exclusively handles business disputes and 
because of that cases can be decided more quickly than other states without such a 
specialized court.20 Because of these and other business-friendly practices, the 
majority of the Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware.21
That is only part of the story however. Local financial and political 
circumstances coinciding with the downturns in the banking industry made the timing 
right for the merging of the two to form the FCDA. The powerful du Pont family had 
one of its own as the governor, the business-minded Pierre du Pont, IV, elected in 
1976. Several of the state's primary industries, chemicals, plastics, manufacturing, 
and agriculture, fluctuated erratically or were in financial trouble. The health and 
environmental hazards stemming from some industries were beginning to draw public 
concern.22 And finally, the state’s "corporate capital", Wilmington, home to the Court 
of Chancery, the DuPont headquarters, most of the state's lawyers, and several other 
sizable businesses, had suffered a severe population decline in the 1960s and 70s, 
resulting in concerns over the city's deteriorating infrastructure, economy, and safety. 
One of the city's largest corporate entities, the chemical company Hercules, Inc., was
20 Harriet Smith Windsor, "Delaware Department o f State, Division o f Corporations 2007 Annual 
Report," March 31, 2008, Delaware State Government files.
21 John A. Munroe, H istory o f  D elaw are, 4th edition, (Newark, DE: University o f Delaware Press, 
2001), 82-3; The state is the nominal headquarters for 61 percent o f Fortune 500 companies and half o f  
the U.S. companies traded on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, "Division o f  
Corporations 2007 Annual Report," Delaware State Government files.
22 See Rachel Carson's Silent Spring (New York: Fawcett Crest, 1962): The first major work o f  
environmentalism, it detailed some o f the health consequences o f chemical pesticides such as DDT  
seeping into food sources. During WWII DuPont produced 11 million pounds o f DDT; Gerard Colby 
Zilg, Du Pont: Behind the Nylon Curtain (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 357.
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threatening to move its headquarters out of the city. These circumstances provided the 
impetus for the merger of public and private interests embodied in the Financial 
Center Development Act.
The Supreme. Court case Marquette National Bank o f Minneapolis v. First 
Omaha Service Corp (1978) altered the landscape, financially and eventually 
physically, of the consumer lending industry. Because it enabled national banks to 
"export" a state's interest rate to customers nationwide, banks began reaching out to 
states which allowed the highest interest rates and pressuring others to eliminate 
interest caps entirely in exchange for obtaining their business.23
In 1969 the First National Bank of Omaha issued its BankAmericard to 
customers living across the country carrying the maximum legal interest rate of 
Nebraska.24 The Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis, an enrollee in the 
BankAmericard plan, brought the suit against Omaha Bank and its subsidiary for 
applying the Nebraska interest rate to customers in Minnesota, which had a lower 
one.25 Marquette argued that the rate in Minnesota protected Minnesota residents.
The case referenced the National Bank Act of 1864, which had established a national 
system of banking in part to oversee funding of the Civil War. In the Marquette case 
the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Act with regard to consumer credit such that 
the usury laws of a bank's location superceded those of either the customer's or the
23 Robert A. Bennet, "Citicorp Plans a Bank in Delaware," The N ew York Times, Section D, 1, August 
7, 1981. Joyce Purnick, "Tax Cuts Weighed for Banks to Keep Them in N ew  York, The N ew York 
Times, Section B , 1, May 11, 1981. Alison Muscatine, "Fourth Maryland Bank Plans Credit Card 
Operations Move," The Washington Post, Metro, B l ,  March 26, 1982.
24 Minnesota had a fixed permissible interest rate o f 12%, while Nebraska law allowed an interest rate 
of 18% on balances up to $1000 and 12% on the balance above $1000.
25 Marquette Nat. Bank v. First o f  Omaha Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
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purchase's location.26 One location became superimposed on another by the rule of 
law, while the customer entered the lawful domain of a "foreign" state.
In the opinion for a unanimous Court, Justice William J. Brennan cited the 
National Bank Act's "authorization 'to charge on any loan' interest at the rate allowed 
by the laws of the State 'where the bank is located."’ Unlike a conventional bank 
transaction in which the customer comes to the bank, here the bank could come to the 
customer without ever leaving its home. It could export not only its services, but its 
"location." The Court thus ruled that, "Omaha Bank cannot be deprived of its 
Nebraska location merely because under the BankAmericard program it extends 
credit to residents of another State."27
Donald Langevoort has characterized the ability of banks to service customers 
in any location as "de facto destruction of geographic barriers."28 He argues that the 
application and interpretation of banking statutes established in another era is 
problematic because the statutes "reflect the marketplace assumptions of their starting 
points in history." In the Marquette case, monetary assumptions from the Civil War 
era were reconstituted into a 1970s credit card operation.29 Since the two cultural 
moments have radically different economies and social structures, the application of 
the same monetary policy raises valid concerns about relevance. And yet the 
reinterpretation of a statute from over a hundred years prior instigated a rapid
26 "Important Banking Legislation," Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/important/index.html.
27 Marquette Nat. Bank v. First o f Omaha Corp.
28 Donald C. Langevoort, "Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role o f  
the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation," Michigan Law Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Feb., 1987): 674.
29 Ibid.
12
geographical shift of numerous lending institutions as they moved to states without 
regulation.
The antecedent to the Marquette case, the National Bank Act of 1864 served 
the purpose of sustaining geographical boundaries and reclaimed the geography 
severed by secession by establishing a national banking system and providing 
oversight to state lenders who provided funding for the war. The Act spawned a 
"dual banking system" of conflicting national and state laws that has been the source 
of legal battles up to the present. What the National Bank Act may have in part 
attempted to provide in the way of stability—financial, national and geographic—also 
served the geographic and financial fluidity of late twentieth-century consumer 
lending.30
Any study of Delaware must begin with the du Pont family. Their legacy 
goes back nearly to the founding of the state and their influence in state politics, 
economics and culture is incomparable. A University of Delaware Political Science 
professor claimed that 1974 polls showed people there had more confidence in 
DuPont than in their church.31 Comparisons to other powerful families such as the 
Kennedys or the Rockefellers fall short when it comes to the du Pont family, largely 
because of the unique nature and culture of Delaware.
30 Another important case that followed Marquette and referenced the National Banking Act o f  1864 is 
Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N. A. It decided that "interest" as mentioned in the Banking Act and 
Marquette, included fees. A California resident who was charged a late fee by Citibank in South 
Dakota challenged the legality o f the fee because it violated California law. The previous Marquette 
decision that established the legality o f  exporting interest rates was determined in Smiley to implicitly 
include various fees under the umbrella o f  "interest." Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N . A. (95-860), 517 
U.S. 735(1996).
31 Cecelia Cohen, Only in D elaw are: Politics and Politicians in the First State (Newark, Delaware: 
Grapevine Publishing, 2002), 224.
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Residing in the second smallest state in the country enabled a large and 
powerful family to affect a wide swath of issues and localities. Largely, although not 
entirely, because of this, Delaware politics is known for what the News Journal 
termed its "cozy" and "inbred" brand of politics.32 In such a small state, with a close- 
knit government and community of political and business leaders, legislation and 
business deals can move much more swiftly than in more cumbersome bureaucracies. 
State leaders double as business and community leaders, and all live more or less 
within spitting distance of each other.33
The difference between Democrats and Republicans also carries less 
distinction than in many other arenas. Neither party has a historic stronghold, and 
there are too few of each party to accomplish much without members from the other 
side. In Only in Delaware, Cecelia Cohen quotes the Delaware National Republican 
Committee chairman (married to a du Pont) discussing his regular duck hunting 
expeditions with the Democratic Committee chairman. "Our political battles are so 
much more civilized than other states, and so are our legal battles, because you know 
you're going to meet your opponent next week." Another factor linking otherwise 
opposing forces is the high percentage of Delawareans associated with the du Pont 
family, by blood, marriage, family ties, or its company. What some call "consensus 
politics" Cohen describes as a requisite hobnobbing, one that voters have come to 
expect in the state.34
32 Cohen, 2.
33 Ibid., 4.
34 Ibid., 5.
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Delaware acquired the motto "The First State" because of its distinction as the 
first state to ratify the nation's Constitution, on December 7, 1787.35 Thirteen years 
later a family by the name of du Pont arrived from France and quickly rose to a place 
of financial and political prominence. Pierre Samuel du Pont Nemours (1739-1817), 
a businessman of French nobility and a friend of Thomas Jefferson, arrived in the 
United States with his family on January 1, 1800.36 The gunpowder factory he and 
his sons founded on the Brandywine River in Delaware flourished by supplying all of 
the U.S. military's explosives needs (facilitated in no small part by Jefferson). After 
the enormous boon to business that was the Civil War, the company gradually 
purchased other manufacturing firms and branched into the newly emerging field of 
chemical engineering.37
The twentieth century brought two world wars that relied heavily on DuPont 
prpducts, among them smokeless powder, explosives (TNT and others), dyes, 
lacquers, ammonia (for refrigeration), film and developing chemicals, cellophane, and 
adhesives. In the 1920s the du Pont family fortune surpassed that of the Rockefellers, 
the Mellons, and the Guggenheims.38 The decade also saw spending power increase-- 
of course nowhere near that of the First Family of Delaware—for the middle class. A 
consumer boom took shape and along with it, the field of advertising blossomed. A
35 73 Del. Laws, c. 268, § 1.
36 Leonard M osley, Blood Relations: The Rise and Fall o f  the du Ponts o f  D elaw are  (New York: 
Atheneum, 1980), 20-21.
37 In fact, DuPont played an integral role in the rise o f chemical engineering as a profession. See Pap 
Ndiaye, Nylon and Bombs: DuPont and the M arch o f  Modern America  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2007), 5-62.
38 M osley, 297.
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cognizance of consumer rights began to take shape as well.39 Consumers' Research, a
membership organization that aimed to keep consumers aware of product safety and 
efficacy was founded at the end of the decade.40 The DuPont Company however had 
bigger problems than a few outspoken customers.
Allegations of overcharging and war profiteering led to a Senate investigation 
in 1934 which gained DuPont the dreadful moniker "The Merchants of Death."41 In 
1935 legendary advertising guru Bruce Barton refashioned the company as a team of 
gentle, thoughtful scientists with the ad campaign "Better Things for Better 
Living...Through Chemistry," and as homegrown patriots through the popular radio 
show The Cavalcade o f America in which tales of humble, little-known American 
heroes were dramatized.42
The Manhattan Project in the 1930s-40s (for which DuPont supplied 
plutonium), and the steep ascendancy of consumer and industrial plastics in the 
1950s-60s continued to pad the pockets of the First State's First Family. It also did 
not hurt that civilian production took shape in federally funded war plants.43 With 
overhead costs subsidized by the government, the potential margin of profit was 
increased.
39 Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers' Republic: The P olitics o f  M ass Consumption in Postw ar America  
(New York: Vintage, 2003), 22-25.
40 Charles F. McGovern, Sold American: Consumption and Citizenship, 1890-1945  (Chapel Hill: 
University o f  North Carolina Press, 2006), 182-5.
41 Ndiaye, 120.
42 Roland Marchand, Creating the Corporate Soul: The Rise o f  Public Relations and Corporate  
Imagery in American Big Business (Berkeley: The University o f California Press, 1998), 218-23; 
W illiam L. Bird Jr., Better Living: Advertising, M edia, and the New Vocabulary o f  Business 
Leadership, 1935-1955  (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1999).
43 In 1939 the U.S. manufactured 213 million pounds o f  plastics; in 1941, 428 million pounds; in 1945, 
818 million pounds; and in !951 , 2.4 billion pounds; M eikle, 125.
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Many DuPont innovations such as nylon and teflon found great success 
beyond the war effort. The post-war expansion of consumer goods and appliances 
included many of which were made with DuPont materials. Perhaps the most far- 
reaching success in terms of sales and innovation was nylon stockings, which had a 
significant cultural impact as well. Susan Smulyan argues that, "DuPont's domination 
of a single market, its positioning of women as middle-class consumers, and the 
mystification of women's use of nylon stand as important steps in the formation of 
mass culture."44 Post-war consumerism grew and with it the rise of general-use credit 
cards.
Throughout the century the du Pont family was not content with merely the 
success of its own company and acquired many others especially in Delaware, 
including newspapers, hospitals, and public utility companies.45 In 1971, consumer 
activist Ralph Nader wrote: "DuPont dominates Delaware as does no single company 
in any other state. Virtually every major aspect of Delaware life—industry, 
commerce, finance, government, politics, education, health, transportation, media, 
charitable institutions, environment, land, recreation, public works, community 
improvement groups, and taxation—is pervasively and decisively affected by the 
DuPont Company, the du Pont family, or their agents."46 Thedu Pont family has
44 Susan Smulyan, Popular Ideologies: M ass Culture a t M id-Century (Philadelphia: University o f  
Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 42; "In the 1950s, nylon symbolized a new way o f life, the future, the spirit 
of America and its mythical modernity," Ndiaye, 2.
45 Ndiaye, 3.
46 James Phelan and Robert Pozen, The Com pany State: Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on 
DuPont in D elaw are  (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973), ix..
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always had close ties to politics including numerous family members holding public 
office.
Throughout its history the family has endowed cultural institutions and some 
family members have played active roles in the community through charity and 
philanthropic works. Their largesse has also sometimes proven to be a double edged 
sword, as it enabled a kind of dependency on charity for things that public and 
regulated funds would otherwise have been established over time. The family or the 
company's charity arm has at times been, "seen as the public government—as a prime 
source of public benefit." But charitable donations, unlike public resources, are not 
subject to public scrutiny or standards. DuPont funding was, "not necessarily based 
on community priorities... [Cjommunity groups cannot make rational long-range 
plans when dependent on DuPont's ad hoc donations."47 For several generations the 
du Ponts took care of Wilmington city responsibilities, "that in most cities fell under 
the aegis of city government..."48 But in the 1950s, the generation of du Ponts that 
had spear-headed such efforts had passed on, and the next generation was in its 
dotage. The younger generation focused on the company, preferring to "give their 
attention to such fields as horse rearing, flower growing, antique collecting, and real- 
estate development." The family paternalism had supplanted city services but when
47 Phelan and Pozen, 35.
48 Carol Hoffecker, Corporate Capital: Wilmington in the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1983), 156.
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the new guard no longer shared the family treasury with Wilmingtonians, the city was 
at a loss.49
Wilmington began the twentieth century as an industrial city, producing 
railroad cars, leather goods, and ship parts.50 DuPont erected an office complex for its 
corporate headquarters in the city in 1908, which brought managerial and technical 
personnel into town.51 The company factory on the Brandywine River expanded 
production for the war and in 1914 over two thousand row houses, bungalows, and 
dormitories were quickly raised, some on top of farmland, to house the additional 
workforce.52
Another influx of workers, primarily African Americans, moved to 
Wilmington during the next World War. With DuPont and the other chemical 
companies expanding their technical and managerial staff, middle- and upper-middle 
class suburban life took shape then as well. Between 1940 and 1950, 3000 African 
Americans moved into the city while 5000 whites moved out.53
A controversial decision in 1959 to build Interstate Highway 95 through 
downtown Wilmington disproportionately affected African American residents. 
Neither city leadership nor the du Pont family's retreating power structure gave 
adequate attention to the heightening social and economic tensions, and "by 1960 
Wilmington was a city in deep trouble."54 The assassination of Dr. Martin Luther
49 Hoffecker, 157.
50 Ibid., 12.
51 Ibid., 110.
52 Ibid., 67-8.
53 Ibid., 123.
54 Ibid., 9-10.
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King, Jr. in 1968 brought anger and despair over racial and class inequities to the 
boiling point in Wilmington. An uprising was met with armed National Guardsmen 
who turned the city into a police state until 1969, making it "the longest occupation of 
an American city by state armed forces."55 When Delaware's population was 
increasing after 1970, Wilmington's continued to decrease. Residents were fleeing 
Wilmington to other counties: Fenwick Island had a 104% population increase and 
South Bethany a 379% increase.56
In 1975, Wilmington's caustic and popular editorial writer Bill Frank 
addressed the city's woes in a column about the rumor that Mayor Thomas Maloney 
had hired a renowned public relations firm to clean up the city's image. He mused 
about who the campaign might attract to the city, "photographers who appreciate 
socially significant problems," such as some of the city's "residential districts where 
dwellings have that appearance Atlanta, Ga., must have had following the invasions 
by Sherman in the Civil War." Frank described the Christina River as "dirty and 
nondescript" while the Brandywine's shores were "marked by piles of junk." The 
city, he acknowledged, had an exciting history, "however, we chose to relegate it all 
to books while we permitted pur landmarks to be desecrated, mutilated, razed and 
ignored. How can a city do that and get away with it? Wilmington did—and that's the 
story the nation might like to know." Through his macabre humor, the reality of the
55 Munroe, 229; "Key dates & times in 1968 Wilmington riots," News Journal, April 6, 2008,
Government and Politics.
56 Munroe, 269.
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city's bleak condition and the frustration it caused for residents such as Frank comes 
through.57
Many of the same national and world economic issues that adversely affected 
Wilmington also impacted the banking industry on Wall Street. Like Wilmington, 
New York City suffered physically and financially from unrest in the 1960s and 70s. 
Middle class whites and manufacturing jobs moved to the suburbs.58 And yet the 
city's operating budget tripled between 1965 and 1975, just as real estate and other tax 
income declined.59 For much of the twentieth century Chase managed the city's 
finances and underwrote its spending through bonds and city securities. As New 
York went through repeated crises Chase, and to a lesser degree other big New York 
City banks, was harmed by its close ties with and obligations to the city. The late 
1970s fiscal emergency nearly landed the city in bankruptcy. That in addition to the 
state having some of the highest banking taxes in the nation led some Wall Street 
banks to consider defection. But the president of Chase during the 1970s, David 
Rockefeller, had family and business ties to New York City that stretched back to the 
days of Standard Oil. Abandoning the city was unlikely under Rockefeller's 
leadership.60
57 Bill Frank, "How to Promote Wilmington," News Journal, August 5, 1975; Toni Young, Becoming 
American, Remaining Jewish: The Story o f  Wilmington D elaware's F irst Jewish Community, 1879- 
1924  (Newark, DE: University o f  Delaware Press, 1999).
58 John Donald W ilson, The Chase: The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 1945-1985  (Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press, 1986), 258; See also Robert A. Beauregard, When Am erica Became Suburban 
(Minneapolis: University O f Minnesota Press, 2006); Douglas M assey and Nancy Denton, American 
Apartheid: Segregation and the Making o f  the Underclass (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1998).
59 W ilson, 259.
60 In addition to being a native N ew  Yorker and having a multi-generational family business in the city, 
David was influenced by his father's work in progressive reform movements in New York in the early
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Meanwhile, Chase's Wall Street neighbor Citicorp* was busy machinating a 
new direction. Although their consumer lending arm, according the bank's historian, 
"was not doing much, except perhaps losing money" the bank's CEO Walter Wriston 
decided against his initial inclination to give up consumer credit altogether. Instead 
he committed to investing heavily in credit operations and initiated a marketing plan 
no other bank had done. Citibank sent tens of millions of credit card applications to 
customers worldwide, which caused an uproar in the banking world, as luring away 
other banks' loyal regional customers was impolitic. Known for his brash 
unconventionality, Wriston proclaimed, "We are engaged, in my opinion, in the 
greatest revolution in the financial service business."61 In 1978 on the heels of the 
Marquette decision, Citicorp speedily found a state willing to eliminate its usury laws 
and allow unlimited interest rates and fees that could be exported nationwide. 
Citicorp set up shop in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Other banks took note.
Rockefeller retired from his post at the helm of Chase in 1980 and installed 
his onetime mentee and the bank's president Willard Butcher as the new CEO. 
Unlike Rockefeller, Butcher did not have multi-generational ties to New York. And 
as a "staunch advocate of free enterprise with minimum government intervention" he
part o f the twentieth century. His brother Nelson was the governor o f N ew  York between 1959-1973. 
See David Rockefeller, M em oirs (New  York: Random House, 2002); W illiam Hoffman, D avid  (New  
York: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1971).
* What began in 1812 was the City Bank o f  New York, then changed to The National City Bank o f  
N ew  York in 1865, then in 1955 after a merger with another bank it became First National City Bank.
In 1968 it became a one-bank holding company called First National City Corporation which was 
changed to Citicorp in 1974. The bank (not the holding company) became Citibank N .A. in 1976; 
Miller, 61. Colloquially the two names are often used interchangeably, which I will take the liberty o f  
doing.
61 Miller, 118.
22
was more than willing to consider moving Chase's credit operations to a more 
hospitable location.62
62 Wilson, 330.
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CHAPTER II
THE BANKS CLEAN UP
Why give away a good clean industry?
-Senator Thomas Sharpe63
You say everybody's entitled to a certain percentage o f profit, did I understand you correctly?
W ell I wish we could get a law passed by the legislature that would grant farmers in the state
of Delaware a certain percentage o f profit.
-Senator Charles W est64
Without personal connections between individuals in the public and private 
sectors, the FCDA might never have come about. The First State had a history of 
corporate legislation and of businesspeople doubling as public officials. From 1977 
to 1985 Delaware's highest publicly-elected official was a former DuPont employee 
and a member of the family which had served as the state's de facto government 
through its philanthropic provisions. Governor Pierre Samuel "Pete" du Pont, IV, 
began his career working at the family company straight out of law school in 1963.65 
Having hoped to become the first lawyer (all before him were scientists) to head the 
DuPont Corporation,-he entered-politics after being passed over for the-company- 
presidency, losing out to another lawyer, Irving Shapiro.66 After one term in 
Congress, du Pont handily won the Delaware governorship. "Brash, cocky, and
63 Delaware Senate Hearings, February 3, 1981, audio cd.
64 Delaware House Hearings, January 21, 1981, audio cd.
65 Larry Nagengast, Pierre S. du Pont IV: Governor o f  Delaware, 1977-1985  (Dover: Delaware 
Heritage Press, 2006), 13.
66 M osley, 396.
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sometimes caustic," according to state Senator Roger A. Martin, du Pont brought a 
"heretofore unseen" managerial attitude to the state.67 With this pro-business leader at 
its helm in 1981 when the bill was passed, Delaware perhaps was poised for a 
quintessential neoliberal enterprise, that is, the elaboration of public policy 
eliminating trade barriers in order to fuel private industry.68
Credit card industry lobbyists today generate some of the largest campaign 
contributions to presidential and congressional elections.69 The FCDA which paved 
the way for financial companies to garner enormous profits was itself crafted by a 
lobbyist representing the banks. In fact, Delaware lawmakers struggled to 
comprehend all of the bill's abstruse financial legalese and arguably never fully 
mastered the details and implications of the law, which they did not "make" at all.
After more than a century of the DuPont Corporation's dominance in 
Delaware, it took the nineteenth-century entrepreneur Pierre du Pont de Nemours's 
scion, the governor Pierre du Pont IV, to wean the state off of its reliance on plastics. 
In 1977 Governor du Pont established a task force to study municipal issues in New 
Castle County, and they determined (as the governor expected) that among other 
concerns the state needed to diversify its economic base and to discontinue its heavy 
reliance on the chemical industry.70
67 Martin, 589-90.
68 Harvey, A B rief H istory o f  Neoliberalism, 3.
69 Federal Election Commission website, http://www.fec.gov/disclosure.shtml (accessed May 14, 
2008).
70 Nagengast, 106.
25
Many Wilmington bankers and lawyers had connections to Wall Street, and 
the idea of Delaware forging further connections with the financial industry had been 
abuzz for years when executives from Chase Manhattan approached the governor's 
office about lifting the state's usury and inviting the bank to the state (federal law 
stipulates that banks must have approval from a state to operate there) in exchange for 
the increased revenue and jobs that their credit card operation would bring.71 As the 
governor's cousin, Nathan Hayward III, the Director of Management, Budget and 
Planning, recounted it, "[Chase] came to us and said, you know, is this an idea that 
would possibly sell in Delaware?"72 The task force already in place became the core 
of the 1980 Bank Task Force for considering Chase's proposal. The chairman of 
DuPont, Irving Shapiro, served as its chair. His personal connections to top 
executives at several New York banks factored crucially in the project's 
germination.73
The governor was facing re-election, but with an eighty percent approval 
rating, he had little to fear. However, Eleanor Craig, one of du Pont’s top economic 
advisors explained that any "unexpected controversy" arising from state negotiations 
with the banks might hurt other Republicans up for election, including presidential
71 Although the term "bank" is used, the entities that are under discussion are bank-holding-companies. 
See James L. Butkiewicz and W illiam R. Latham, "Banking Deregulation as an Econom ic 
Development Policy Tool," Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 57, No. 4  (Apr., 1991): 961-974; 
Michael A. le ssee  and Steven A. Seelig, Bank Holding Com panies and the Public Interest: An 
Economic Analysis (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977).
72 Nagengast, 106.
73 During the hearings Shapiro said, "I have met with every banking group that came into Delaware to 
ask questions...I have had them over for dinner or lunch or had them in my office for business 
discussions.... Chase and Morgan both have executives who are personal friends o f mine...I gave them 
a confidence that they might otherwise not have had [about coming to Delaware]," House hearings cd; 
"From the Halls o f J.P. Morgan to the Shores o f Delaware," The Econom ist, February 7, 1981, 79.
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candidate Ronald Reagan.74 The task force also went to great lengths to hush the 
governor's Democratic opponent. O. Frances Biondi, a Democratic attorney who 
within months would become the attorney and lobbyist for Chase and Morgan during 
the negotiations and still another well-known Democrat, the Vice President of 
DuPont, Chuck Welch, urged underdog candidate Bill Gordy not to leak the deals 
being made with the credit card banks. Biondi and Welch argued that making the 
bank deal a contentious campaign issue might jeopardize an agreement that would 
transform Delaware's lagging economy.75 Despite the obvious relevance to the 
public, plans for the deregulation of the state's consumer interest rate were shrouded 
from its view.
Some of the task force operations did leak to the press. A New York Times 
article titled "New York Banks Invited to Delaware," describes a letter written by 
Wilmington mayor William T. McLaughlin to several of the major New York banks. 
The article affirms that several banks in the city were potentially looking to take their 
business elsewhere. In the letter McLaughlin assured the banks that they would find 
"the business and political climate here...warmly receptive to this kind of business."76
Eleanor Craig remembered that du Pont's Secretary of State Glenn Kenton, 
Secretary of Finance Weston "Pete" Nellius, Nathan Hayward, and she all 
participated in face-to-face negotiations with Morgan and Chase. She went to New
74 Nagengast, 108.
75 Ibid., 109; Roger Martin, phone interview with the author, April 21, 2008.
76 "New York Banks Invited to Delaware," N ew  York Times, July 23, 1980, D5. Another similar article 
even earlier: Robert A. Bennett, "Banks May Shift Units Out o f State," New York Times, June 11,
1980.
27
York upwards of twenty times and claimed the others went to Wall Street about fifty 
times each. The banks would ask the Delaware officials about specific aspects of the 
labor force and economic landscape in Delaware, and then Craig and the others would 
research the issues and present their findings back at Wall Street.77 Employees on the 
state payroll were essentially conducting market research for private companies free 
of charge.
In the summer of 1980, Chase Manhattan executives including Chief 
Operating Officer Tom LaBreque, met with the governor and other state officials in 
Wilmington to seal the deal about moving its operations into the state. The 
Delawareans convinced the bankers that passing the bill within the month of June was 
unrealistic, and waiting until after the November elections would increase the chances 
of smooth passage.78 Following the meeting, officials from Citicorp, Morgan 
Guaranty, and Manufacturers Hanover also came to discuss their potential stake in 
Delaware.79
It should be kept in mind that the banks involved in the discussions were also 
active competitors with each other. Kenton recalled that Chase wanted to find 
another state in which to relocate besides South Dakota. Although that state had 
already eliminated its ceiling on interest rates, Chase did not want to be seen as 
following Citicorp's lead. Citicorp had for decades been seen as a maverick in the
77 Nagengast, 109-10; The "aggressively pro-business policies o f Delaware's incumbent Republican 
administration — headed, appropriately enough, by Gov. Pierre S. du Pont, a member o f the state's first 
family o f  business," John F. Berry, "Delaware Wears New Business Heart on Its Sleeve; Delaware: Its 
Love Affair With Business," The Washington Post, March 9, 1981, Business, 1,.
78 Nagengast, 110.
79 Ibid.
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banking industry while Chase had a reputation for complacency and a "continued 
lateness in moving into new markets...always a follower rather than a leader..."80 For 
Chase to move halfway across the country to set up shop in South Dakota would have 
only drawn more attention to its reputation as an imitator of Citicorp's innovations.
Morgan Guaranty, which at the time did not have a credit operation, joined the 
negotiations in the summer of 1980 at the invitation of Kenton and others in the state 
after the initial meeting with Chase. With an eye towards luring as many major 
banking entities into the state as possible, Kenton, Singleton, Hayward and Biondi 
visited Morgan top brass in New York and, as Kenton recounted, "We said what do 
you want? And they said we're just getting the heck taxed out of us up here and we 
need to have a low-tax environment."81
Kenton marveled at their ability to keep the negotiations under wraps: 
"Nobody found out about it. It's just an amazing thing. Nobody had any clue what 
was going on other than people in the public sector."82 Neither Delaware lawmakers 
nor business people in their recollections, as far as I have been able to assess, 
entertained the idea that citizens might have had a right to know and be involved in 
the deal-making that irrevocably would affect the future of their state, let alone 
consumers across the nation. Public comment on the legislation was limited to the 
small window of about a week in January of the following year when the banks'
80 David Rogers, The Future o f  American Banking: Managing fo r  Change (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1993), 103-5.
81 Nagengast, 112.
82 Ibid., 111.
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deadline for passage was rapidly approaching.83 Some viewed the negotiations, once 
they were known, as the Wall Street banks' ploy to pressure New York to eliminate 
its usury laws. The Economist wrote: "In many ways the banks are holding a gun at 
New York's head."84
Six months after the initial meeting between Delaware and bank leaders, a 
final draft of the bill was introduced to key legislators for the first time at a breakfast 
held by Governor du Pont on January 14, 1981. DuPont chief Irving Shapiro spoke to 
the legislators at the breakfast stressing the positive impact such a law could have on 
Delaware's economy.85 "Opportunity has knocked," Shapiro announced, "and the 
question is whether we are willing to seize it and build for the future with jobs, 
investments and new economic activity."86 The lawmakers were handed the bill full 
of legalese and told that the banks had established a deadline for seizing the 
opportunity: February 4.87
Despite press characterizations that the legislation was shuttled through the 
house with little debate, some legislators did question the possible downsides of the 
bill.88 Almost all discussion over the bill's potential benefits focused on the state's 
economy, jobs, and citizens. In presentations and questions about possible
83 Jeff Gerth, "Delaware Bank Bill Causes concern."
84 "From the Halls o f  J.P. Morgan to the Shores o f  Delaware." The N ew  York legislature shuttled in a 
temporary abatement o f  bank interest rates the November before the FCDA was passed in a fruitless 
gesture o f accommodation. Shortly after Delaware passed the FCDA and Chase and Morgan had 
already committed to relocating, N ew  York permanently eliminated its usury ceilings (as did 
Pennsylvania, N ew  Jersey and Maryland) and lowered its taxes on banks, but could not come close to 
Delaware's tax incentives.
85 Jeff Gerth, "Law Freeing Banks Near in Delaware," The New York Times, February 4, 1981, D5.
86 Berry.
87 Nagengast; 111.
88 Berry; Gerth, "New York Banks Urged Delaware to Lure Bankers."
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deleterious effects, legislators focused not only on Delaware, but on national 
considerations. The great majority of questions by legislators about the bill and the 
amendments, meanings, terms and potential impact, were directed at Frances Biondi, 
the bank lobbyist. As the principal author of the bill, he was a good candidate for 
explaining most of its provisions to the legislators, but less likely to discuss its 
downsides. The Delaware General Assembly at the time had no members who were 
attorneys by profession. Any legal expertise brought to the bill had to be provided by 
people outside the legislature.89 Senator Thomas B. Sharp (D) spoke during the 
hearings and expressed frustration at the complexity of the bill, "I spent considerable 
time reviewing and analyzing and trying to determine in my mind exactly what we 
were doing[in this bill]. ..I find in various sections of it that that is very difficult.”90
The bill specifically and explicitly aimed to attract Chase and Morgan’s credit 
card divisions to the state in hopes of adding jobs and revenue. Representative Harry 
E. Derrickson (R) during the House hearings made clear that the legislation was 
initiated by the banks. "In offering ... and in agreeing to come to the state, it's my 
understanding that the commercial banks made in essence three stipulations," and 
then perhaps trying to soften his implication that the banks were running the show, he 
corrected himself by continuing, "or three requests, of the state of Delaware."91 The 
requests were that outside bank holding companies be allowed to establish residence
89 Senate hearings cd; Nagengast; Jeff Gerth, "New York Banks Urged Delaware to Lure Bankers,"
New York Times, March 17, 1981, A l.
90 Senate hearings cd 1.
91 Hearings for House B ill 28, Delaware Senate, Legislative Archives, Hearing, February 3, 1981, 
audio cd.
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in the state, elimination of the usury regulation on consumer credit, which included 
abolishing caps on fees, and a low tax rate.92 Derrickson, "I can see no harm coming 
to the citizens of the state of Delaware as a result of this legislation. I can see the 
potential for a great deal o f good."93 Since Chase and Morgan agreed to establish 
operations in Delaware if interest rates were eliminated, the introduction of a new 
business sector into the state held the promise of jobs and revenue that would benefit 
residents.
Several parts of the bill drafted by Biondi addressed industries other than 
credit cards, such as car loans and house mortgages. These provisions were 
questioned—some legislators even mentioned being unaware of them until the 
hearings—but ultimately they remained in the bill. Senator William M. Murphy, Jr. 
(D) expressed reservation that raising the legal limit for penalties on car financing 
was necessary to attract Chase and Morgan to the state.94 An amendment was 
proposed to redact all mentions of loans and transactions unrelated to credit cards 
from the bill. The primary witness to answer questions about the amendment was 
Biondi. Senator Thomas B. Sharp (D) asked him, "If I were to vote for this un­
amended, how would it affect my constituents? I think you know this legislation 
better than anyone since I think you were the prime drafter of this legislation. What 
am I doing to the people I represent? Am I helping them or hurting them?" Posing 
such questions to the author and lobbyist for the bill severely limited the potential for
92 Theresa Humphrey, "Delaware Legislature Passes Bank Lure Package," The A ssociated Press, 
February 4, 1981, Business News; Gerth, "Law Freeing Banks Near in Delaware."
93 House hearings cd.
94 Senate hearings cd.
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a negative assessment. Biondi responded, "It is not going to cost your constituents 
anything that...wouldn't have happened anyway...It is a unique opportunity for an 
industry to come into this state....[for] many people who don't have jobs, an 
opportunity to create a service industry."95 Perhaps Biondi's worst argument was also 
his best: It is going to happen anyway, so we might as well do it. This logic was 
equally applicable to both questions: Why should we do it? and Why should we not do 
it?
Senator Martin brought a philosophical bent to his line of questioning. He 
attempted to find out what the impact might be on the nation's consumers. "Is there 
any way to determine...within the next six months or a year, what the cost will be to 
the public as opposed to what the state of Delaware gains?" Biondi, who throughout 
the hearing provided quick and skillfully captious responses, answered, "... I think we 
can, I think that interest rates that are charged in this state are known....to consumers 
in this state, just like electric bills are known to consumers in this state."96 His answer 
did not address the senator's broader question of harm, but rather played dumb, as if 
the question had been Will people know how much their credit card bill costs when 
they receive it in the mail? The legislators essentially accepted his answer without 
question.
Senator Martin continued his inquiry. He began with the somewhat rhetorical 
question of how long Delaware has had a usury law, and before he crystallized his 
point, Biondi broke in, "Probably [since] biblical times...I suggest to you, sir that we
95 Senate hearings cd.
96 Ibid.
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live in a credit economy today, where credit is essential...a material part of our 
economic existence. And interference with credit mechanisms interferes with the 
standard of living for many people." The Senator persevered in his line of 
questioning, "Do you ever wonder, Mr. Biondi, why in all these decades....[the usury 
law] was never taken off the books, even through the hardest of times?" Biondi 
responded, "Yeah I think about that ...when I think about why those people thought 
the world was flat for 500 years...." Senator Martin: "One thing for certain if we do 
this, is, at least for the moment, prices will go up as was [the case] with the 
deregulation this past week and the proposed ten percent hike in gasoline." Biondi 
took the untenable position that one cannot "analogize what happens in one sector of 
the economy with what happens in another sector."97
Senator Charles P. West (D) focused for several minutes on the potential 
hazards higher credit interest rates might have on consumers nationwide since the 
banks that moved to the state would be exporting the interest rate to card holders in 
other states. Apparently frustrated with Senator West's pursuit, Biondi said, "We're 
not talking about exporting a contagious disease," to which West replied, "Some 
people in these other states may think so." Biondi also remarked, "You've assumed 
that if rates are allowed to go higher, they will." Exasperated, Senator West 
exclaimed, "Well, it's not so they can go down!"98
Ted Kellar of the Citizens Coalition For Tax Reform in Delaware testified at 
the public hearing for the law. He argued against the generous tax break that the
97 Senate hearings cd.
98 House hearings cd.
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banks would be getting. The incoming banks would be paying much less taxes than 
the local banks already in the state. "Why should a bank that makes $200 million 
have a rate of 3.45 percent?" he asked, arguing that Delaware would become a tax 
haven like the Bahamas. One Senator responded, "If we don't have any of that 
[income] now, and we can attract that through favorable tax laws, and...reduce 
personal income tax....why should we not do that?...Aren't we helping the people that 
we're supposed to be serving?" Kellar responded, "It depends on your ethics. My 
ethics says that those that can afford to pay society should pay society." He remarked 
that banks were already paying fewer taxes in the state than any other corporation. 
"Do we want to intensify injustice? That's what this does."99
Kellar argued that the elimination of the usury was already a sizable incentive 
for the banks and, he reasoned, since the New York bank tax was upwards of 26 
percent, requiring the incoming banks to be subject to the 8.7 percent tax rate 
applicable to Delaware banks would be equitable and still provide incentive. The 
rates in the bill at present, Kellar said, were "lower...than their wildest dreams." 
Andrew G. Knox (R) pried Kellar for some clarification: "I'd like some comments on 
that subjective statement that the rates are lower than their wildest dreams. What's the 
basis for that statement?" Kellar: "I think that's probably wrong because the way it 
looks to me...it sounds like Chase in particular has written this bank bill." Knox did 
not give up: "But I don't think you're answering my question. How do you know that 
that's beyond their wildest dreams? I mean I'm serious. That's a subjective
99 Senate hearings cd.
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statement." Kellar maintained: "Well I would think that if they're paying 26 percent 
now I wouldn't think they would ever think that they could go somewhere with this 
rate." Knox: "So this is an opinion, and not based on any statements from them." 
Kellar continued with his argument that "we" will end up paying later if the bill is 
passed and Knox mumbled about never having been asked to conduct dream analysis 
before. Kellar: "It's only a word don't let it bother you." Senator Martin asked Kellar 
if he could understand how the rates were an inducement to bring a new revenue 
source to the state. Kellar responded, "It's going to impact across the whole nation," 
and he didn't want his state involved in "dirty money."100
Part of the enticement of bringing the financial industry to Delaware for 
lawmakers hinged on the "cleanness" of the industry as opposed to the polluting 
chemical and plastics manufacturers whose plants had periodic fatal explosions. The 
financial sector which deals with paper and abstract concepts such as time and rate 
variables stood in stark contrast with cancer-causing detritus seeping into Delaware's 
rivers and soil. Kellar draws a comparison, not necessarily intentionally, to the 
polluting industries by calling attention to the "dirty money" of big banks. The water 
supply of Delaware might not be sullied by the banks, but in Kellar's view the 
conscience of the state would not remain clean by reaping the rewards of unrestrained 
usury.
100 Senate hearings cd.
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One senator expressed concern that the "reasonable" clause did not precede a 
section under discussion.101 He asked Bill Moran, Executive Vice President of 
Wilmington Trust, if a lender could "charge whatever he wants," giving the example 
of 35 percent interest on a three-month loan. Moran confirmed: "If the borrower were 
willing to pay it, yes." Senator: "If a small office-type operation which might spring 
up overnight, or a mail-order business with high enticement tactics, could they use 
that section of the law to go into an extremely high interest rate position?" Moran: 
"The bill provides for a free-market interest rate and yes anyone could attempt to do 
that." The senator offhandedly remarked, "So the only thing we haven't excluded is 
the breaking of the legs to collect it I guess."102 The explicit comparison to mafia 
loan-sharking made clear that at least one legislator saw the act as justifying what in 
other circumstances might be considered criminal.
One of the dozen or so amendments proposed and struck down in the Senate 
concerned the compounding of interest, which is when unpaid interest and fees are 
added on to the principal, and interest accrues on the entire amount. The interest, in 
other words, becomes principal.103 Senator Robert J. Berndt (R) asked consumer 
attorney Douglas A. Schactman, "You mean to tell me that I can let that loan go and 
go and go and go and not pay the interest on it and not have to compound that interest 
on it? Am I understanding you right? There's no point in my ever paying a loan off 
then if I'm not going to be penalized in some way." Although he apparently had a
101 The senator's name is inaudible on the recording.
102 Senate hearings cd.
103 Ibid.
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fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between interest and compounding 
interest, Schactman’s reply did not appear to set the senator straight.104
After another legislator had a similar take on compounded interest as Mr. 
Berndt, Senator Connor brought some clarity to the subject, "This compounding of 
interest is interest on interest....I think there's a misunderstanding here. It doesn't say 
that there is no interest, that is extremely important." He said that current high 
unemployment rates and "the dire emergencies that we find ourselves in in the 
economy" underscore the need to provide "some assistance to the consumer." But his 
explanation of the concept was followed by another senator arguing that without the 
compounding of interest delinquent customers would be let off too easy. Besides, he 
argued, "if you pay on time, won't there not be any interest on interest?"105
Schactman had originally put forward that consumers might lose their job or 
have financial setbacks during which the compounding interest could make the 
ultimate debt overwhelming. Senator Berndt explained that he had had several 
constituents and family members who had lost jobs or had gotten into "tough spots" 
financially and as a result were temporarily unable to make their mortgage payments. 
The Senator said that he went to the banks, explained the person's situation, and 
received "compassion" on the part of the financial institution. "I've had splendid 
results," he said, "Have you ever tried that? ...You are making it appear as 
though...the industry is very ruthless."106
104 Senate hearings cd.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
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Schactman, dumbfounded, replied: "I don't know what to say to that." After a 
long pause, he found something to say: "I can tell you story after story of that not 
being true....I would respectfully state that you don't know Chase Manhattan, you 
don't know Morgan Guaranty, you don't know who else two years from now might 
want to come in and take advantage of the provisions under this law...you will have 
given them carte blanche to do whatever is provided in this act..." Senator Berndt: 
"Well, what the Lord giveth, the Lord can taketh away, and the General Assembly 
can do the same thing." John A. Campanelli, Jr. (D) interjected: "Mr. Berndt....I hope 
we don't consider ourselves on the same plateau as the Lord although sometimes we 
act that way...."107 Given that legislatures rarely repeal laws, Berndt's remark was 
more disingenuous than sacrilegious.
Many aspects of the bill presented the lawmakers with complex legal and 
financial descriptions of which they sought clarification from Biondi and others. One 
issue addressed striking interest rate limitations on retail installments. In a section 
about establishing the prepayment interest calculations for the installments, Senator 
Herman M. Holloway, Jr. (D) asked a question that repeatedly came up during the 
hearings on a number of topics, often without a direct answer from Biondi: "Will this 
have any substantial effect on consumers?" Uncharacteristically, Biondi expressed 
uncertainty: "You would have to ask someone in the business about that..." 
Holloway: "As far as the firm lending money, is it my assumption that the rate of
107 Senate hearings cd.
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lending [will] be uniform to all buyers?" Again, Biondi: "I'm not an expert in this 
area..."108 His uncertainty only indemnified the banks.
Senator West expressed his concern about the impact increased interest rates 
can have on people's lives and his skepticism of their necessity. "I've heard so much 
about how much this legislation will do for the state of Delaware, and...[how] 
everybody is gonna prosper. If you'll go back just a few years.... people decided... we 
should de-control energy. You see what happened there. The Federal Reserve said 
we're gonna cure inflation with the monetary system. You see what happened there... 
What makes America so great, [is] that the average American citizen could borrow to 
build a home, to buy an automobile ...Today they can't do that...because of the interest 
rate." He then sarcastically referred to the banks' claims of continued losses, "Yet 
nobody's making any profit." He urged the legislators to give the same consideration 
to the "average person" as they were giving to the financial institutions.109
The House voted for the bill with two minor amendments, 33 for and three 
against, with four abstentions and one absence. The Senate vote was scheduled for 
the day before the deadline. Had any of the Senate amendments passed, the bill 
would have to have returned to the House for another vote, risking the deadline. The 
Senate passed the bill with 14 in favor and seven against.
Despite voting for the bill, the Democratic Majority Whip of the Senate told a 
reporter that he felt the legislation was intentionally "mystifying" and was unfairly
108 Senate hearings cd.
109 Ibid.
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introduced with too little time to study it.110 Some legislators who may have wanted 
to vote against the bill also knew that they would one day come up for re-election and 
the largest campaign contributors in the state, DuPont, Hercules, and most of the large 
businesses and wealthy individuals who ran those businesses favored the bill." 
Representative Campanelli, President of the Delaware AFL-CIO "took a walk" during 
the vote in order to avoid recording a vote against the bill.111
At the public signing of the law on Feb 18, 1981, Governor du Pont said, 
"Today, Delaware steps forward as the nation's newest center of business and finance. 
We are doing so, first, because we want to enhance our State's economy and secure 
more and better jobs for our citizens, and second, because we can see that there are 
major changes occurring in the way the nation does its banking and its business."112
Frances M. West, head of Delaware's Division of Consumer Affairs, felt that 
consumers had been blindsided by the bill. Her state-run department was not made 
aware of the bill while it was under construction.113 And yet, Governor du Pont told 
an audience at the Chicago Executive Club that the legislation was a "community 
wide effort for economic expansion" and that "all segments of our community worked 
together to enact this legislation."114
The end result of the discussions and deal-makings that occurred across state 
lines, between public and private entities, and on both sides of the aisle was the
110 Gerth, "New York Banks Urged Delaware to Lure Bankers."
Nagengast, 114.
112 D elaw are Lawyer, Fall 1982, 33; Governor du Pont’s schedule for the week o f  February 15, 1981, 
Delaware Public Archives, Governor’s Papers, du Pont administration.
113 Gerth.
114 "Future Directions o f State in Economic Growth," Delaware State Archives, Governor du Pont 
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Financial Center Development Act which eliminated the regulating ceiling on both 
interest rates that lending institutions could charge on purchases and loans, as well as 
on fees (e.g. late fees, annual fees, cash advance fees).
The FCDA allowed large financial institutions opening offices in Delaware to 
conduct nationwide lending. It enabled banks to foreclose on homes in the case of a 
default and applied the new fee structure retroactively: customers who already had 
accounts with the institutions would be subject to the new fee structure on balances 
that accrued before the law was in place. Moreover it instituted a regressive tax 
structure to banks earning over $20 million—by charging as little as 2.7 percent in 
income tax, well below that of any other state.115
Many of the provisions in the FCDA included safeguards so that state banks 
would not be bought or forced out of business by the national banks. The FCDA 
stipulated that banks could only have one office open to the public "for the conduct of 
banking business" but that they must employ at least 100 people within the state.116 
Banks had to open with a minimum of $10 million in holding and have $25 million 
within in the first year, thus targeting only high-income banks.117 The financial lives 
of millions of nationwide consumers were altered for the promise of a few hundred 
jobs.
Another safeguard to ensure that the incoming banks would not interfere with 
the in-state banks, whose support was essential to the law's passing, the FCDA banks
115 H.B. 28, del. laws. 801-, Feb. 18, 1981.
116 H.B. 28, a.
117 H.B. 28, c.; "No bank now in Delaware earns more than $20 million a year, while Chase had profits 
of $365 million last year." Teresa Humphrey, A ssociated P ress , Feb. 4, 1981.
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were to be "operated in a manner and at a location that is not likely to attract 
customers from the general public in this State to the substantial detriment of existing 
banking institutions located in this State"118 The incoming banks, really bank-holding- 
companies, were barred or restricted from the practice of conventional banking 
functions. They were by law confined to an unobtrusive and even almost clandestine 
existence insofar as Delawareans were concerned. The Delaware Lawyer in 1981 
noted, "At least one FCDA bank says that its computers are programmed to avoid 
mail solicitations to persons with Delaware zip codes."119 Protecting Delaware 
residents from the high-volume credit card solicitations and virtually hiding the banks 
from view suggests that state lawmakers saw the new revenue-builders as potentially 
predatory. They protected the state's banks before consumers.
The press noted the bill's favoritism of the banks against consumers who were 
left unprotected and whose rights were abrogated. The Economist called the law "a 
banker's paradise," noting that "there are all manner of rules designed to favour [sic] 
the banks at the expense of the consumer..." William Robbins of The New York 
Times wrote: "Among the loneliest people in this diminutive coastal state are its 
consumer activists."120 James Boyle, director of government relations for the 
Washington-based Consumer Federation of America decried the bill as "outrageous"
118 H.B. 28, d.
119 Del. law, 8 2 ,63 .
120 W illiam Robbins, "Delaware Courting Companies for Jobs," The N ew York Times, June 27, 1981.
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and compared the banks to tum-of-the-century railroads who, "wrote the law to enrich 
themselves."121
The month after the FCDA was passed the governor and his cousin Nathan 
Hayward went shopping for banks. They traveled to institutions in Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, Chicago, Phoenix and New Orleans to communicate personally the 
potential benefits of the FCDA and to enjoin banks to take up residence in the First 
State. They exported their message in hopes of importing more "clean industry" 
revenue builders. In total, 34 banks kindly accepted the invitation.122
121 Berry.
122 Ibid., Gerth, "New York Banks Urged Delaware to Lure Bankers"; Governor's papers, Delaware 
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CHAPTER III
THE ARCHITECTURE OF DIVISION
B y the end o f  the century...credit cards were bigger than chickens, 
bigger than chemicals. Credit cards had becom e the single most 
powerful force in the state's econom y, a goose that laid golden egg  
after golden egg.
-from Pierre S. du Pont IV: Governor o f  
D elaware, 1977-1985  by Larry Nagengast123
The poor remain as distant as ever from the prosperity that in 1981 
politicians promised was on the way.
-Daniel Atkins and Robert Hornstein,
1993124
The racial and economic stratification that characterized much of 
Wilmington's history during the twentieth century did not subside with the advent of 
the FCDA and its promise of prosperity. In fact, according to several studies 
(discussed below), many citizens at the lowest rungs of the economic ladder fared 
worse. David Harvey has criticized neoliberal policy as having the "tendency to 
increase social inequality and. „expose the least fortunate elements in_any_ society . „ .to_ 
the chill winds of austerity and the dull fate of increasing marginalization."125
123 Nagengast, 105.
124 Robert Hornstein and Daniel Atkins, "Piercing The Corporate Veil: A  Different Delaware Beyond 
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In contrast, the credit card industry flourished following the elimination of 
usury limits. Its profits swelled along with consumer indebtedness. As soon as a 
financial holding company moved into Delaware it could charge its credit card 
customers new fees and implement retroactive interest rates (by applying a new, 
higher interest rate on purchases consumers made prior to the passage of the law). 
The trend of greater bank profits and consumer debt has continued up to the 
present.126 During 1980, the year before the FCDA passed, the total amount charged 
to credit cards in the U.S. was $69 billion, today it is upwards of $2 trillion.127 Credit 
card debt grew 20 percent annually from 1982 to 1990.128 In 2003, consumers' 
average debt was 130 percent of their disposable income.129 Greater consumer debt 
correlates to greater industry profits. Likewise, the allocation of infrastructure and 
spatial arrangements maximize corporate capital while many less-advantaged 
individuals remain grossly underserved. According to Edward Soja, capitalism
126 For instance, between 1990 and 2005, "U.S. households in the aggregate have devoted an increasing 
-share o f their after-tax income to th ep aym en tof financiaTobligations7..[muchrifwhich] is attributable ~
to a rise in the level o f credit card debt," and "Recent developments in the credit card market and the 
financial obligations ratio," Board o f  Governors o f  the Federal Reserve, 2005,
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Recent+developments+in-Hhe+credit+card+market+and+the+financial 
+...-a0141706817 (accessed May 14, 2008). See Floyd Norris, "Some Debt Trends Are Good. This 
Isn’t One o f Them," N ew York Times, January 12, 2008, Business.
127 In 2005 it was $1.8 trillion. "Credit Card Practices: Current Consumer And Regulatory Issues 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee On Financial Institutions And Consumer Credit..." U.S. House Of 
Representatives, April 26, 2007, Committee on Financial Services Serial No. 110-26,
U .S. Government Printing Office Washington: 36-821 PDF, 2007, 4.
128 Evans and Schmalensee, 77.
129 Brett W illiams, D ebt fo r  Sale: A Social H istory o f  the Credit Trap (Philadelphia: University o f  
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"intrinsically builds upon regional or spatial inequalities."130 Uneven geographical 
development sustains private industry growth.
Citibank was an innovator in the late 1970s for nationwide, mass-mailed 
credit card offers, but today eight billion pre-approved credit card applications sent 
from hundreds of different bank entities and retailers are sent out, adding up to an 
estimated 73 offers per home each year.131 Although banks initiated the FCDA to 
profit from an expanding nationwide consumer base, Delaware lawmakers passed the 
bill largely because of the promise of benefits for local residents. These two distinct 
interests came together: nationwide consumers and local "producers." During the 
hearings for House Bill 28, legislators and lobbyists spoke repeatedly about the 
positive impact the law would have on Delaware's citizens, while consumer advocates 
argued the law would harm local and national citizens, and still other legislators 
sought to determine how and if the bill could harm citizens of Delaware or other 
states.
The prevailing opinion about the FCDA is that it was a boon to Delaware's 
economy and a huge success. More banks and jobs appeared after its passage than 
the du Pont administration at first predicted. The governor said they were expecting 
2000 bank jobs and 2200 spillover jobs with the two banks that had committed to 
coming.132 The banking industry grew to 10 percent of the state's workforce, adding
130 Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion o f  Space in Critical Social Theory 
(New York: Verso, 1989), 107.
131 Bob Sullivan, Gotcha Capitalism : H ow Hidden Fees Rip You O ff Every Day, and What You Can Do 
About It (New York: Ballantine Books, 2007), 41.
132 Untitled type-written speech, Delaware State Archives, 1981, Governor's Papers, DuPont 
Administration, numbered p. 6.
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somewhere between 40,000 finance sector jobs and 87,200 total jobs during the 
1980s. Bank franchise taxes before the law were $2 million and a decade later were 
$100 million a year.133 Even Roger Martin, one of the most assertive questioners of 
the bill during the hearings and one of the seven senators who voted against the bill, 
now sees it as a positive influence on the state's economy, calling it "the right thing to 
do at the right time."134
During the hearings Frank Biondi said that the elimination of interest rate 
caps was a concept whose time had come.135 In a speech shortly after the law was 
enacted, du Pont remarked, "Usury ceilings have never served a very useful purpose. 
If they are lower than market rates, they discourage lending and encourage 
borrowing, causing an excessive demand for available credit. If the ceilings are 
higher than market rates, they have no impact." The FCDA was, "a natural response 
to the changes occurring on the national level in the banking industry."136
After stagnant economy and an annual population decrease, only months after 
the FCDA had passed, construction took off in the city. Before altering the state's 
budgets and employment rolls, the FCDA first impacted the construction industry, 
which reached record levels for the state during preparations for new office buildings 
and infrastructure.137 Between August 1981 and May 1982, four office buildings, two
133 Hornstein and Atkins, 299.
134 Phone interview with the author, April 10, 2008.
135 Senate hearings cd.
136 Untitled type-written speech, du Pont Administration, Delaware Archives, p. 7.
137 Maureen Milford, "Landing a big corporate tenant revives the hopes o f a high-vacancy Delaware 
office development" N ew  York Times, August 18, 1993, Real Estate, D16.
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of them high-rises, began construction.138 Tens of millions of dollars were invested in 
building construction throughout the 1980s. The city saw new multi-level parking 
garages and multi-use buildings, with offices on top and merchants on the street level, 
were among the new edifices. The Amtrak station undertook a $2 million renovation 
to accommodate the increased commuter traffic.139 A 15-story, 230-room hotel with 
meeting facilities was erected in 1987. That year some of the new revenue paid for a 
new $7 million police building downtown. June and July of 1987 saw some of the 
greatest construction activity, including an office park with three 15-story buildings 
and a parking garage.140
Democratic Mayor William T. McLaughlin secured $40 million worth of 
Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG), a program initiated by the Carter 
administration to offer low-interest loans for businesses in "struggling downtowns." 
Joe Biden, the senator from DE (then and now) had close ties with President Carter 
which allowed him some pull regarding the selection of UDAGs. Former mayor of 
Wilmington Tom Maloney, serving at the time as the regional director of HUD, also 
worked to direct funds to the city.141 The state formed a Chamber of Commerce 
because of the new business and funding activity.142
138 Building permits, W ilmington, Delaware State Archives, August 1981-May 1982, microfiche roll 
78.
139 Building permits, Wilmington, Delaware State Archives, October 1984-December 1986, microfiche 
roll 82.
140 Building permits, Wilmington, Delaware State Archives, January-July 1987.
141 Cohen, 278.
142 Ibid., 281.
49
The historic levels of construction in Wilmington and its surrounds also put a
drain on local resources.143 Historian Cecelia Cohen wrote that building spurts, 
"swallowed up land, congested the roads, strained the water supply during droughts 
and burdened the electric power system in extreme heat or cold."144 After nearly a 
decade of construction projects financed in large part by Delaware builders hoping to 
cash in on the stream of new bank tenants, the stream began to dry up by the late 
1980s. The extraordinary building boom overextended its reach, and the city 
experienced one of the highest office-space vacancies nationwide.145 By 1992, 
average leasing activity dropped by 61 percent from the previous 5-years, according 
to a study conducted by a presumably disappointed commercial real estate firm in 
Wilmington.146
The city's thirty-year population decline began to reverse once the banks 
moved in.147 By 1990 the city had gained 1300 residents from 1980, not a significant 
number, but a marked change from the previous four-decade steady decline.148 The 
state's high unemployment rate in the 1970s and (1980-81) had incurred a $44 million 
debt to the Federal Government for unemployment insurance which was repaid
i-M ilfo r d , "Landing Big Corporate.-.-"------------------------------------------------  ----------
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before the end of the 1980s.149 State debt was being paid off just as consumers 
nationwide were beginning to take on more of it.
The economic growth was hardly distributed evenly however. A study 
conducted by Robert Hornstein and Daniel Atkins in 1993 raised questions about the 
efficacy and equity of the FCDA and its so-called "economic renaissance." They 
profiled the "other" Delaware that did not reap the alleged collective benefits of the 
State's consumer banking industry.150 The authors found that the state's prosperity 
eluded those who needed it most: "To look at Delaware beyond its boardrooms 
today," they wrote in 1993, "is to witness the contradictions and consequences of an 
economy fueled by the promise that what would be good for the nation's banks and 
the wealthy would necessarily be good for all Delawareans — and most notably 
Delaware's poor."151 Hornstein and Atkins found that poverty worsened in the mid- 
1980s. In 1985, 11.5 percent of the state's population were living in poverty, and by 
1986, 20 percent were in poverty or hovering very near it.152 The number of families 
in 1985 in need of low-cost housing exceeded the available low-cost housing by 
123.7 percent. Housing costs increased when new banks and businesses moved into 
the state, but low-income housing was not among the projects undertaken in the 
building boom.153 At the time of their study in 1993, Hornstein and Atkins found the
149 Martin, H istory o f  D elaw are Through its Governors, 582-3.
150 Atkins and Hornstein, 291-S.
151 Ibid., 302.
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situation with low-income housing "virtually unchanged."154 People working in the 
finance-related new service sector were priced out of new homes. The Delaware State 
Housing Authority in 1989 concluded that "wages were not keeping pace with rising 
housing costs."155 The FCDA brought new jobs, but its building bonanza 
simultaneously raised living expenses higher than the low-paid service sector jobs 
available to working-class Delawareans. The boom benefited Delaware businesses 
more than its citizens.
Although there was steady economic growth in the state after the FCDA 
passed, it was concentrated in the insurance and financial services sector. 
Manufacturing jobs continued to decline after the FCDA.156 Hornstein and Atkins 
concluded that in the years following the FCDA, the poor in Delaware remained, "as 
they were in 1981...ill-housed, in need of more food and better nutrition, and paid less 
than what they need to adequately support their families."157 Trickle-down economics 
only trickled down to the middle class.
Nine years after Atkins and Hornstein1 s study, in a 2002 article the Delaware 
Lawyer reviewed some of the financial and racial iniquities in the state. Attorney 
Antoine Allen gave a bleak overview of racial economic stratification. Blacks earned 
60 cents on the dollar that whites earned and Blacks and Hispanics were "under­
represented in professional and upper-level management positions and over­
154 Atkins and Hornstein, 304-5.
' 155 Ibid., 305.
156 "In 1981, manufacturing comprised 28.2 percent o f  all jobs in Delaware while only four years later, 
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represented in the lowest paying and least desirable occupations."158 Even when 
controlling for income, African Americans had less home ownership than whites.159 
Minority-owned businesses were well-represented in the service sector in 2002, but 
were "virtually absent" from financial services, reported Allen.160 The decade 
preceding the writing of Allen's article saw increased integration in some 
communities in Delaware, yet others had become more segregated during that period, 
"especially" lamented Allen, "within the City of Wilmington."161
In her dissertation concerning neighborhood viability in Wilmington's East 
Side—the African-American neighborhood adjacent to the business district—Alicia 
Joyce Peterson found that between 1950 and 1990 urban development did little to 
help the impoverished area and often made economic conditions worse for its 
residents.162 Like Hornstein and Atkins, Peterson concluded that the increase in jobs 
and state revenue did not trickle down to many low-income, high need residents. She 
additionally determined that urban renewal projects, including investment in 
infrastructure that resulted from the FCDA like the UDAGs, splintered communities, 
leaving many low income African Americans with less cultural cohesion and more 
housing and employments problems. Peterson's study traced various federal, city, 
state, public and private investments in city infrastructure from 1950-1990 centering 
on changes in the Wilmington neighborhood of East Side. Her study did not
158 Antoine J. Allen, " The Pace O f Progress In Delaware: The Jury Is Still Out," D elaw are Lawyer,
Vol. 20, No. 12, (Fall 2002): 31.
159 Ibid., 32.
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specifically take into account the FCDA, but addressed some of the infrastructure 
changes in the 1980s and 90s that were directly or indirectly brought about by the 
new banks.
Peterson argued that assessments of impoverished areas rarely took into 
consideration the lived experience of its residents. Tearing down "decaying" low- 
income housing complexes and replacing them with new middle-income housing or 
businesses might create the appearance of an improvement, but without alternative 
affordable housing, the displaced residents had fewer housing options and were worse 
off. Wilmington's Central Business District was built on top of much of the previous 
East Side neighborhood. African Americans were moved out to make room for 
FCDA-generated business. Peterson shows that the East Side of the 1940s, which 
despite poverty, segregation and lack of sufficient housing and job opportunities, had 
a thriving community that included black-owned businesses, jazz clubs, and a sense 
of cultural cohesion.163 But through the decades of urban renewal, when problems 
that neighborhoods such as the East Side faced were addressed, policy makers saw 
viability as an issue of "high-end development" and business enterprise and missed 
important issues such as cultural cohesion, livability, and the viewpoint of residents
163 Peterson wrote: ''In interviews East Side residents consistently indicated that their neighborhood 
was a good place to live in 1950. It was home to a cluster o f professionals and recognized leaders. It 
had the Gold Coast along French Street where black business flourished. It was a mecca for African 
American entertainment and culture with a theatre and nightclubs. Howard High School was the only 
school available to black students in the State o f Delaware. The East Side, a major part o f  the 
segregated Wilmington School District, provided opportunities to exercise leadership. Individuals and 
institutions contributed to a sense o f pride and self-sufficiency that are important elements o f  
community viability," 43.
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(who were often supposed to be benefiting from government largesse). As a result, 
many East Side residents fared worse after urban renewal.164
The viability of an area targeted for urban renewal has been defined by policy­
makers as one of commerce and the physical appearance of houses and buildings, but 
Peterson defined "a viable neighborhood'1 as "one where the quality of living provides 
for not only the essential needs of its residents but for their preferences as 
well...Viable neighborhoods provide stability through their diverse economic and 
physical infrastructures and exhibit a strong sense of community within their socio­
cultural linkages."165 She contextualized her considerations of the East Side with 
urban policy studies, from which she drew three general conclusions: "1. public 
programs did not always meet the goals laid out in urban development legislation, 2. 
policies were subverted by business-led interest groups that influenced the 
implementation process and defined viability from a market perspective, and 3. 
policies did not take into consideration the livability of the renewal area from an 
indigenous perspective."166 From Peterson's study of 1950-1990, some of the changes 
that occurred following the passage of the FCDA come into focus.
Most of the discussion during the House and Senate hearings for House Bill 
28 focused on bringing jobs and revenue to Delaware.167 Although Wilmington did 
not surface as the potential prime beneficiary of the bill, the city's mayor was the only 
one of the state's mayors invited in as a prime participant. Mayor McLaughlin wrote
164 Peterson, 82-84.
165 Ibid., 2.
166 Ibid., 4.
167 House hearings cd.
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the letters to the New York banks "inviting'' them to his city.168 And as the state's 
corporate headquarters for the previous century, the beneficiary of the bill and the 
location of the potential new banks was always implicitly Wilmington. The 
legislators also knew very well that the city had a flagging economy and declining 
population counter to the rest of the state's growth.169 Peterson’s dissertation 
addressed programs that were ostensibly directed at urban renewal but that failed to 
take into consideration neighborhood viability. But she did not consider that some 
urban renewal grants such as the UDAGs may have been sought and utilized by 
Delaware officials with the sole purpose of supporting the banks and without any 
intention of lifting up low-income residents. Peterson interviewed numerous 
residents and community workers to obtain an "indigenous perspective" of changes to 
the neighborhood over time. Her study addressed cultural issues of the East Side that 
were absent from all of the other Delaware and Wilmington histories I read, in that 
culturally rich aspects of the low-income areas were profiled rather than simply being 
a story of racial and economic victimization.
The city of Wilmington applied for and received UDAGs which were invested 
almost solely into business enterprise. The focus of the UDAG program in Peterson's 
assessment points to a common assumption "that the problem of poverty stems from 
the lack of physical and financial capital."170 Publicly funded infrastructure that 
resulted directly from the influx of bank and related businesses in Wilmington
168 "New York Banks Invited to Delaware," N ew  York Times, July 23, 1980, D5.
169 Munroe, 130.
170 Peterson, 15.
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provided street paving, new sidewalks, and street lights to the central business district 
"where the healthier sectors, banking, and government were."171 The city 
improvements for the most part stopped short of the East Side neighborhood area 
where low income and small local businesses stood. "In fact," according to Peterson, 
"many [indigenous residents] were forced to relocate from the improved areas to 
other deteriorating neighborhoods."172
Improvements in the Central Business District rendered the East Side 
residential area, "a space to be contained and in many ways exploited to provide the 
needed space for downtown expansion."173 A conglomeration of city municipal 
buildings called the Civic Center that was built in 1963 cut off East Side residents 
from the commercial area. The structure included a cement wall that blocked access 
between the two areas, a physical barrier that reified the separation between East Side 
residents and economic access. When MBNA built its headquarters in Rodney 
Square in 1994, its six-building complex further extended the Civic Center's wall of 
separation between East Siders and downtown business.174 Jane Jacobs notes that 
borders in and of themselves exert influence on the areas they divide. Borders denote 
inclusion and exclusion.175 Jacobs also argues that money invested into a community 
"cannot buy inherent success." When it is used for projects that exclude indigenous 
communities for instance, it can make matters worse. Financial investment can "do
171 Peterson, 121.
172 Ibid., 122.
173 Ibid., 162.
174 Ibid., 82, 166.
175 Jane Jacobs, The D eath and Life o f  G reat American Cities (New York: Vintage Books, 1992 
[1961]), 257.
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ultimate harm where it destroys the conditions needed for inherent success...money is 
a powerful force both for city decline and for city regeneration."176 Peterson lamented 
that urban development programs altered the neighborhood's boundaries and provided 
programs that "had no relationship to indigenous viability factors." Indigenous 
institutions that contributed to a city's viability, she found, were given little 
consideration.177
Wilmington’s decline throughout the twentieth century has revolved around 
issues of racial tension, segregation, and income gaps. When lawmakers sought to 
transform Wilmington to a corporate center, they failed to take into account how or 
why the city had declined in the first place. For instance when the DuPont company 
moved its headquarters into Wilmington in the early twentieth century, its middle- 
and upper-middle-class managerial workers did not infuse the city with new tax 
income, but instead took to the suburbs. When barracks-style housing was built for 
the primarily African American industrial workforce increase during the two world 
wars, they were not readily replaced with adequate affordable housing during 
peacetime. "Slum" housing was torn down without foresight for the low-income 
families who were left in the cold. The FCDA gave the city a face-lift and revenue 
shot in the arm, but the city faced increasing crime, housing vacancies and vandalism 
problems, conditions which worsened from lack of jobs and economic stratification, 
much like during the 1920s and 40s and 60s. In other words, lawmakers hoped the 
FCDA would help Wilmington by infusing the city with more of the things that had
176 Jacobs, 292.
177 Ibid., 113.
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exacerbated many of its racial, social, and economic problems in the past. It was a 
band-aid on a problem created by decades of putting band-aids on problems.
I think part of the mythology of the FCDA's universal success for Delaware 
and Wilmington, is based on assumptions of proprietorship. When lawmakers and 
historians reflect on the enormous good the law and the bank migration had on the 
state, the question left out of the equation is whose state is itl If the FCDA benefited 
Delaware, whose Delaware is it?
Collective "ownership" of a state or entity’s identity carries the illusion of a 
collective access to resources. "Our state" or "our business" suggests parity to the 
primary benefits of membership. Delaware's motto "It's good being first" carries the 
suggestion that there is a "we" who is first (the state's citizens) and that "we" find the 
privileges that come with being first (in statehood and presumably other tangible or 
intangible superlatives) empirically good or conferring some pride or benefit.178 The 
implied collective Delaware who gained jobs and income from the FCDA was a 
limited pool of people and institutions. Those who fared no better or worse after the 
FCDA surely were far from being "first" in order of state priorities. Atkins and 
Hornstein, Allen, and Peterson discuss which of Delaware's citizens have (repeatedly) 
come in dead last.
178 W ebsite for the State o f  Delaware, http://delaware.gov/ (accessed May 14, 2008).
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CHAPTER IV
JUSTIFIED PARANOIA: YOU ARE BEING WATCHED
The people who may have been left out of the benefits package the FCDA 
allegedly brought to Delaware were overshadowed, literally, by the buildings that 
symbolized the trophy of the legislation. Office buildings were hardly foreign to 
Wilmington, which had for a century participated in the legal construction of national 
corporations through its Court of Chancery. Wilmington's economic past figured into 
the radical architectural alterations in the 1980s. During the 1990s, DuPont's 
Wilmington headquarters was overshadowed by the office park built by MBNA while 
at the same time the family-owned chemical company was surpassed by the bank as 
the state's largest single employer. Flourishing enterprise enabled by a legislative 
framework defined neoliberal political theory on the rise during the 1980s.179
Since the implementation of the FCDA, credit cards have grown into a multi­
tiered surveillance circuit that monitors customers' personal information. Information 
is then sold, rented or handed over to various other-agencies including retailers, 
insurers, political parties, and potential employers. Just opening a credit card account 
subjects one to a vast array of surveillances. Making credit card purchases subjects 
one to third party access of buying habits. Perhaps it should come as no surprise then
179 Maureen Milford, "Landing a big corporate tenant revives the hopes of a high-vacancy Delaware 
office development," N ew York Times, August 18, 1993, Real Estate, D16.
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that the capital city of consumer credit processing has an extensive surveillance 
system on the ground, at least partly prompted by the credit companies in residence. 
In the commercial district outdoor security cameras became connected to the security 
systems of many of the area's banks. The security organization which monitors 
downtown was initiated by MBNA and is funded by pooled resources of area 
businesses.
Identity also factors significantly both in the credit industry and Wilmington. 
For example "expressing" one's identity through purchases or the type of credit card 
itself takes place with the aid of consumer technology. One can be identified as a 
suspect by law enforcement through the aid of a video camera or as a potential 
wrongdoer because of geographic or demographic identification. And if someone 
breaks into your bank account or manages to use your credit card illegally, it is 
called—not just theft—but identity theft. Being robbed becomes akin to losing one's 
identity.
Michel Foucault has asserted that the monitoring and rationalization of 
people's bodies, identities, and behavior establishes the power structure in modernity. 
The order and categorization of people, "coincide[s] with the development of 
capitalism."180 Control and ownership are linked according to Foucault. The two are 
also crucial to the commercial district in Wilmington and the credit card industry. 
Monitoring bodies and personal information enables those in power to prevent threats 
and hindrances to commercial enterprise and to protect and seek out those who will
180 Michel Foucault, trans. Robert Hurley, The H istory o f  Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume I (New  
York: Random House, 1978), 5.
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participate in that enterprise. William G. Staples asserts that a distinguishing factor 
of postmodern social controls, rather than the rationalization Foucault traces through 
modernity, is the local nature of current surveillance techniques.181
Lloyd Klein's It's in the Cards: Consumer Credit and the American 
Experience examines the relationship between consumer credit, social control 
mechanisms, and the imposition of cultural values. "Social experience" argues Lloyd, 
"is transformed into a consumer product."182 He asserts that the service sector and 
niche marketing introduce social controls in the form of rewards and punishments 
carried out by the credit system. The state of Delaware too was submitting to a 
system of controls when it passed the FCDA, because the jobs and revenue did not 
flow immediately upon passing the bill. Instead, banks pushed for additional tax 
breaks and real estate deals in Wilmington. The city was rewarded when additional 
banks besides the original two, Citicorp and Morgan Guaranty, moved into town. A 
private policing entity facilitated in part by the banks turned its scrutiny onto the city.
The FCDA was sold as a panacea for many of Delaware's ills: joblessness, 
budget deficits, unstable and high-polluting industries that dominated state 
economies. Much in the manner of the FCDA, both the state and city stepped in to 
encourage new business tenants with land-grants and corporate tax-abatement 
programs. The new arrival of financial institutions waned towards the end of the 
1980s. One major construction project came to a halt midway through the demolition
181 William G. Staples, The Culture o f  Surveillance: D iscipline and Social Control in the United States 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 11.
182 Lloyd Klein, I t’s in the Cards: Consumer Credit and the American Experience (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 1999), 2.
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and excavation stages, when the Beneficial Corporation decided to leave Wilmington 
altogether. The city became desperate to find a new tenant to take over the aborted 
construction project that left "an embarrassing hole" in the middle of downtown. 
After heavy lobbying by city officials, MBNA agreed to move into Wilmington from 
the nearby suburbs and turn the project into its headquarters.183 The city donated two- 
thirds of the land (a $6 million value at the time) for the building, which also included 
a five-year tax abatement on the real estate after which time a 50 percent tax relief for 
the following five years would ensue. The bank also received a five-year break on the 
"head tax" which charges employers a per-employee monthly tax ($6 a head in 
1994).184 The office complex MBNA built dominated the downtown landscape. 
Architecture Magazine characterized the physically imposing structure as a, 
"massive...headquarters [that] robs the area of urban activity...[and]...discourages 
pedestrian life."185 The city gave MBNA land on which the bank built a fortress 
symbolizing its social distance from civic life and institutions.
MBNA's agreement to move to Wilmington also included the express 
stipulation that the city institute a Business Improvement District (BID), which would 
require all downtown businesses to pay an assessment for private security and 
maintenance in the 70-square block area around Rodney Square.186 In 1994, the state 
passed a bill establishing a BID and the entity created to manage it was a non-profit
183 Milford, "Landing a big corporate tenant."
184 Milford, "The business district in Wilmington, Del., is reviving, with commitments from four 
companies," N ew York Times, February 2, 1994, Real Estate, D17.
185 Michael Maynard, "Maxed Out" Architecture M agazine, November 1997, 71.
186 Downtown Visions website: "Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) are geographically defined 
areas in which property owners agree to pay an assessment in addition to property taxes to fund 
privately-operated cleaning, security and marketing services."
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company called Downtown Visions (DV), which provides security, cleaning, and 
public relations for the businesses in its vicinity.187 In April 2001 the company 
implemented a Video Safety Partnership and set up twenty-five cameras in downtown 
connected with 100 security cameras already in place by downtown businesses, all to 
be managed by DV. "Our program is the only one of its kind in the United States in 
that it is the only video system which covers an entire downtown district, in addition 
to being linked with other corporations' video systems. This network allows for the 
live feeding of events to law enforcement officials."188
Downtown Visions works directly with the police department, reporting 
suspicious or criminal behavior, as interpreted by the employees stationed in front of 
the screens twenty hours a day. According to a press release from the office of 
Wilmington's mayor James Baker in 2005, the company has, "evolved into additional 
'eyes and ears' for the Wilmington Police Department."189 The staff is made up 
largely of former police officers (and in a recently implemented program, those 
aspiring to join the police force.) According to DV, the company has assisted the 
police in 600 "incidents" since the video monitoring began.190 The surveillance 
system was largely spawned and the funding organized by John Greer, a former FBI
187 "June 1994, House B ill 387, sponsored by State Representative Joe DiPinto, passed in the Delaware 
General Assembly which allowed the creation o f  business improvement districts. In September o f that 
year, City Council passed an ordinance, sponsored by then-council President James M. Baker. This 
legislation created Wilmington's Downtown Business Improvement District (W DBID), a private, 
nonprofit organization," D V  website, www.downtownvisions.org.
188 Downtown Visions Video Safety Partnership website, 
http://www.downtownvisions.org/videosafety.php (accessed May 14, 2008).
189 "Wilmington Mayor James Baker Leads Celebration For Downtown Visions 10th Anniversary" 
O ffice of Mayor James M. Baker, press release, May 19, 2005.
190 Downtown Visions website.
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agent who owned a business that sells high-end security devices. DV also became an 
arm of his business by selling its products and services, with endorsements by city 
officials, to other municipalities.191 Wilmington's security cameras thus are products 
of the neoliberal ethos enabling free enterprise through the structures of the state. 
The city's Business Improvement District, itself a public-private partnership, 
purchased the cameras from a private organization which has its origins in the federal 
government (the FBI).
Although cameras silently observe, they also have the ability to assert their 
presence in an attempt epistemologically to shift power dynamics. For instance 
official Downtown Visions literature asserted that the cameras were meant to, 
"correct the misperception that it's not safe downtown," suggesting that part of its 
objective was an alteration of Wilmington's image. The presence of the cameras and 
the live analysis of its images need not be seen, but must be known for the intended 
perceptual shift to occur. In order for individuals to perceive downtown as safe, they 
must be aware of the presence of the technology which allegedly makes it so. The 
Downtown Visions website claims that its goal is to assure people that "someone will 
always be looking out for their safety." The surveillance system is not meant to make 
everyone feel safe, however; for some people it is the reverse. It announces to them 
that they are being watched, although in fact everyone is being watched.192 Staples 
notes that the omnipresence of security cameras marks "a historical shift from the
191 The company is Geer Security Consulting International, Inc. Company profile: 
http://www.manta.com/coms2/dnbcompany_fk56cg (accessed May 14, 2008).
192 Downtown V isions website.
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specific punishment of the individual deviant to the generalized surveillance of us 
all." Social control p reced es  rather than p ro ceed s  deviance193 In this way 
surveillance systems attempt to control time as well as space. To anticipate and 
visually "apprehend" criminals before they act is a way to tell the future and alter it 
before it happens.
In Discipline and Punish Michel Foucault applies the notion of the 
panopticon—the central, octagonal survey tower of medieval prisons—to the broader 
power infrastructure that utilizes surveillance, acquisition of knowledge, and 
categorization to level control and discipline on society as a whole. The omnipresent 
"faceless gaze" serves the goals of the political anatomy by disseminating its 
influence and power broadly with relatively little human interaction.194 The 
Wilmington surveillance system similarly casts a disciplinary gaze; it was a 
precedent-setting downtown security system, the most comprehensive in the country 
when it was implemented.195
Bart Simon asserts that the panopticon metaphor resonates today because it 
"seems to speak to the sense of helplessness individuals often feel in the face of the 
overwhelming force of institutions (prisons, hospitals, schools, workplaces, families) 
to determine life within their confines...the sense that there is nowhere to run and
193 Staples, 6.
194 Michel Foucault, trans. Alan Sheridan, Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f  the Prison  (New York: 
Viking Press, 1975), 214.
195 Bart Simon, "The Return o f Panopticism: Supervision, Subjection and the N ew  Surveillance," 
Surveillance & Society  Vol. 3. No. 1 (2005): 3.
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nowhere to hide."196 In "How Closed-Circuit Television Surveillance Organizes the 
Social," Kevin Walby argues that social policy is increasingly influenced by images 
in our televisual, surveillance-oriented culture. Walby finds a "presumptuous 
ambition of both state and non-state organizations to see and to know everything." 
The project of modernity as described by Foucault is the implementation of power 
through rationalization. Walby argues that the rationalization is written on the body 
of the watched.197
The people who pass through downtown Wilmington's Rodney Square, 
whatever their purpose, are subjects of the camera's eye. The person who does not fit, 
visually or behaviorally, within the established norm is identified and potentially 
confronted on the ground by a company employee or city service. Downtown 
Visions seeks to make those who are fitting nicely into the business district—workers 
and shoppers—feel safe, protected within the realm of commercial seclusion.198
In "Of Other Spaces," Foucault discusses sites which are both real physical 
locations and exist on a plane outside of other spaces, marked off by their 
impossibility. They are "counter-sites in which all other sites are represented, 
contested, and inverted." These "heterotopias," Foucault argues, mirror possibilities 
which are not possible; they are "placeless places." The heterotopia creates a space
196 Simon, 5; See also, Vol. 1 No. 3 o f  Surveillance and Society  (2003) themed "Foucault and 
Panopticism Revisited."
197 Kevin Walby, "How Closed-Circuit Television Surveillance Organizes the Social," The Canadian  
Journal o f  Sociology Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring 2005): 208.
198 City o f  Wilmington Mayor's Office o f Cultural Affairs website, 
http://riverfrontbluesfest.com/thingstodo.html (accessed May 14, 2008).
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that is other. The image promoted through Downtown Visions publicity promotes a 
downtown that could never be.199
Since surveillance and GPS (global positioning) devices originated from the 
military to track enemy troops, their entry into the civilian and consumer realm 
inscribes its subjects as "militarized consumers," argues Caren Kaplan.200 Marketing 
strategies "target" consumers to participate in commerce. Both types of strategies 
utilize information about a person's identity in order to categorize them in relation to 
commercial enterprise: what type of products this person will want, what kind of 
threat that person may pose. The coordinated surveillance operations in Wilmington 
(between company and "non-profit" cameras, between private DV employees and city 
police) suggests an area under attack. If there is an enemy it is the impoverished that 
have struggled in Wilmington for decades. The utilization of military and cold-war 
era surveillance techniques in the project of consumption means that public and tax- 
payer-funded technologies are serving the interest of private industry.
Downtown Visions security and cleaning companies might imply that 
downtown Wilmington is too dangerous and too dirty to be serviced only by city 
police and sanitation services. The Wilmington heterotopia is "outside of all places," 
because it is pure and safe and yet so dirty and dangerous as to need a private military 
surrounding a 70-block area.201 The cleaning division of Downtown Visions removes 
trash, cleans sidewalks, and removes graffiti in order to, "improve the way downtown
199 Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces," D iacritics  Vol. 16 No. 1 (1986): 22-27.
200 Caren Kaplan, "Precision Targets: GPS and the Militarization o f U.S. Consumer Identity,"
American Quarterly Vol. 58 No. 3 (September 2006): 697.
201 Foucault, "Of Other Spaces."
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Wilmington looks." Clean serves as a metaphor for safe. A safe area is "clean" from 
any foreign elements, anything or anyone who detracts from Wilmington's improved 
look, anything or anyone who might deter productive consumption. "The imperative 
of capital accumulation," Walby writes, "induces a desire to exclude flawed 
consumers from territories of consumption."202 The cleaning services and cameras 
both serve to sterilize the commercial district for its optimum output. "Dirt" has a 
history of referring to an array of undesirable traits in various cultures. It has 
frequently stood as a signifier for racial or cultural "other."203 Downtown 
Wilmington's "mirror," the closed circuit television, is a signified for all possible 
signifiers, it indicates to some that they are free and to others that they are 
imprisoned. It advertises to some that downtown is clean and to others that they may 
be removed in order to keep the area free from "dirt."
The electric eye of the camera amplifies social difference, although the 
rationality of its omnipresence does not discriminate in that it watches everyone, 
regardless of race, class or gender. But the poor and people of color tend to be under 
watch, whereas people who can pay for "all that downtown Wilmington has to offer"- 
-largely middle-class and/or white—are the ones being "watched out" for.204 Both 
categories of people are located like military targets, or as Kaplan eerily puts it, 
"something or somebody has to be identified, coordinates have to be determined with 
available technologies, and the target has to be clearly marked or recognized in time
202 Walby, "Closed-Circuit Television," 207-8.
203 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis o f  the Concepts o f  Pollution and Taboo (New York: 
Routledge Classics, 2002).
204 Downtown Visions website.
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and space." 205 Regardless if one is the target of protection or exclusion by the powers 
that be, everyone in downtown Wilmington is a walking target.
Shortly after MBNA recruited the head of the F.B.I.’s New York division in 
2002 to serve as the senior executive of its "property management and support 
services," the Wilmington police instituted Operation Bold Eagle. This project 
authorized unmarked police vans to survey downtown areas and apprehend, search, 
and photograph people they deem likely to exhibit fu ture  criminal behavior.206 
According to an article in Time Magazine, the police usually apprehend African 
American men, "at drug-infested street corners in search of guns, crack and heroin." 
The mayor's spokesman described the goal of the practice: "There is a simple 
message: We know who you are; you now know that we know who you are. Don't 
come back on this corner and deal drugs."207 His statement suggests that geography 
(or real estate) is at stake.
Operation Bold Eagle's "corner deployment units," referred to by residents as 
"jump-out squads," have sparked controversy with civil rights groups and residents. 
The executive director of the Delaware ACLU contested the legality of the 
geographical profiling, and told the New York Times, "It cannot be the case that I have 
fewer rights because of the neighborhood I'm standing in." In the same article, Mayor
205 Kaplan, "Precision Targets," 697.
206 William Rashbaum, "F.B.I.'s New York O ffice Head Leaving for a Delaware Bank," New York 
Times, February 9, 2000, B4.
207 Nadya Labi, "Stop! And Say Cheese: Wilmington Police Are Snapping Pictures o f  People in High- 
Crime Areas and Taking Names. Is This Legal?" Time. Vol. 160, No. 13, September 23, 2002, 53.
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James Baker’s retort was, "Until a court says otherwise, if I say it's constitutional, it's 
constitutional."208
The Wilmington police department also drew fire for building a database of 
these "potential suspects" which includes photos and information of individuals that 
are deemed likely by the police to break the law in the future regardless of what, if 
any, they may have broken in the past. Mayor Baker fumed that criticism over the 
police practice was, "asinine and intellectually bankrupt."209 Whether or not the 
creative tactics of the Wilmington police lower crime, they do make headlines. The 
New York Times ran a story around the same time as the jump-out squads 
controversy, reporting that police take down license plates of cars "prowling the city's 
worst drug-infested neighborhoods" and then send a letter to the car's registrant about 
their findings. The letters "are meant to alert unsuspecting parents and spouses that 
their loved ones may be buying drugs in Wilmington."210 The project attempted to 
enlist others in surveillance and bring the police gaze into the home.
Other cities have adopted the surveillance of Wilmington, using it as a model, 
and some cities and locations have rejected the practice. In 2003, the Washington 
D.C. city council approved the use of police-controlled public surveillance cameras. 
Council member (now mayor) Adrian Fenty explained how he was persuaded by 
some of his fellow members to vote against the measure. "At first, I thought
208 Ryan Lizza, "The Year in Ideas; Ghetto Profiling," The N ew York Times M agazine, December 15, 
2002.
209 N ick Farrell, "US cops build Minority Report database: List of'likely' law breakers causes 
outrage,"
Incisive Media/vnunet.com, 27 Aug 2002, http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2119889/cops-build- 
minority-report-database (accessed May 14, 2008).
210 "Delaware: Cars A  Weapon In Drug War", New York Times, December 31, 2002, National, 17.
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Washington, because it's prone to more terrorist attacks, would be a place where 
visitors would want cameras. But I agree now with my colleagues who say 
Washington should be a beacon of freedom."211
Being under constant review of the camera's watchful eye carries with it a 
cost. The watchingness of the camera, regardless of whether or not any action is 
taken as a result of its presence, takes a toll on the freedom of its subjects. Instead of 
confining disciplinary action to those who commit crimes, everyone is under watch. 
Instead of an area of "confinement" for offenders, there is "an inexhaustible supply 
of...disciplinary 'space.'" All space becomes tinged with a policing presence and thus 
too an air of criminality.
In 2003, Mayor Baker held a press conference announcing a joint initiative 
between Downtown Visions, the city police, and the city transit system, DART, for 
the purpose of reducing "nuisance crimes." All 150 county buses and the twelve bus 
stops in the downtown area would display posters encouraging citizens to 
immediately report instances of loitering, public intoxication, lewdness, and 
panhandling via a dedicated hotline. Citizens and visitors should be able to enjoy the 
city, according to the mayor, "without being bothered, insulted or feeling threatened" 
by those who exhibit "nuisance behavior." Through the "monitoring talents of the 
Wilmington Police and Downtown Visions," the mayor assured, "we are sending a 
clear message that violators will be arrested and law abiding citizens should be
211 Bill Clements, "Big Brother's Corporate Sponsor" Citypciges, June 18, 2003, Minneapolis/St. Paul, 
Vol. 24, Issue 1176.
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afforded a pleasant experience while they are in our beautiful and historic City." This 
was another program enlisting citizens in policing other citizens.212
"Cleaning" Wilmington of those who might disturb or frighten downtown 
shoppers and tourists served the aim of further developing the retail and banking area, 
which had already benefited from precedent-setting deregulation, tax-abatement, and 
community improvement grants. Surveillance, jump-out squads, and a privately- 
funded security company attempted to discipline and displace those who break the 
law, participate in extralegal economy such as drugs, or who are deemed future 
criminals due to their appearance or what part of town they frequent. These 
"deviants" are among the population that has been systematically left out of economic 
prosperity in Wilmington, that is, African Americans and the working class. Dean A. 
Vietri, Director of Safety Operations for the downtown business improvement district 
said of the surveillance system efforts, "We're making arrests, and we're displacing 
crime. Our hope is to displace criminals right out of the city."213
A similar kind of surveillance has taken shape for consumers nationwide. 
Financial institutions and credit bureaus collect personal data from people and sell or 
rent to a wide variety of companies and individuals. When a person attempts to take 
out a mortgage, rent an apartment or buy a car, institutions can purchase a credit 
report. Most people are aware of this process and likely even find it a fairly
212 "Wilmington Police, DART First State And Downtown Visions Team-Up For A  New Initiative To 
Reduce Nuisance Crimes," Office o f  Mayor James M. Baker, press release (April 9, 2003).
213 "Case Studies: Wilmington, Delaware Shares 'Lesson Learned’ with other Inner Cities Aiming for 
Surveillance," Videolarm press release, August 2007,
http://www.videolarm.com/case_study.jsp?content=10 (accessed May 14, 2008).
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reasonable breach of privacy. But less well-known are the companies that buy and 
sell private information in vast quantities to third parties without a consumer's 
knowledge. One of the biggest such companies, Acxiom, has been in business since 
the 1970s and buys swaths of financial and personal information, collects it, sorts it, 
and re-sells it. The title of an article on the company from Fortune Magazine in 2004 
summarizes it well: "Never Heard Of Acxiom? Chances Are It's Heard Of You." 
Acxiom is a $175 million publicly traded company that allegedly has customer data 
of 96 percent of American households. They hold 5 acres of 6-foot data storage 
processors which together have the capacity to hold 50 times the material held in the 
Library of Congress. Acxiom has helped the government with terrorism indictments, 
but 99 percent of its business is commercial enterprise, including, "nine of the 
country's top ten credit-card issuers, as well as nearly all the major retail banks, 
insurers, and automakers."214
Acxiom and other personal-data trafficking companies can produce lists 
containing, "highly specific demographic slices, including Hispanic families with 
children; Asian-American mail-order buyers; women who buy wigs; gamblers; 
male buyers of fashion underwear; and political-minded Christians."215 Credit card 
companies sell information to personal data companies, but also in turn buy data lists 
from them containing information from a vast array of sources including utility
214 Richard Behar, "Never Heard O f Acxiom ? Chances Are It's Heard O f You. How a little-known 
Little Rock com pany-the world's largest processor o f  consumer data—found itself at the center o f  a 
very big national security debate," Fortune M agazine, February 23, 2004,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2004/02/23/362182/index.htm (accessed  
May 14, 2008).
215 Paul M. Schwartz, "Property, Privacy, and Personal Data," H arvard Law R eview , Vol. 117, No. 7 
(May, 2004): 2105.
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companies, institutional membership lists, mail-in warranty cards, and public records. 
The information is then used to target customers with credit card offers and affinity 
credit cards. MBNA* achieved much of its success in the 1990s through affinity 
marketing, a kind of mirroring back to customers a pastiche of "unique identity." 
Affinity cards are themed and targeted to particular groups and organizations, such as 
alumni of a particular institution. The cards carry a related image, such as the school 
mascot, and in many instances a certain percentage of the profits charged on those 
cards goes to the organization or charity. Some cards simply express an aspect of the 
cardholder's identity or hobbies, such as an American flag, a Celtic cross, or golf 
clubs, and do not have a donation associated with them. The lack of any 
distinguishing qualities between products, according to George Ritzer, is what fuels 
branding. In the case of credit cards, very little distinguishes one from the other and 
affinity cards "create the illusion of distinction."216
Affinity marketing in the credit industry has proven to be very successful. The 
steep ascendancy of MBNA's early success was its innovation in affinity cards and 
the faux-prestige of "elite" cards such as the MBNA Platinum, which had "few 
benefits...other than the color," yet in a year and a half attracted six million new 
customers.217 Marketing to people's identity—causes, organizations or status that one
* M BNA has since been absorbed by Bank o f  America.
216 George Ritzer, Expressing Am erica: A Critique o f  the G lobal Credit Card Society (London: Sage 
Publications, 1995), 182.
217 Saul Hansell, "MBNA Continues to Build on a Plastic Foundation," New York Times, Oct 22, 1997, 
D l.
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identifies with—has proven very effective.218 Through a detailed study of credit card 
contracts and agreements, Ronald J. Mann concludes that even contractual differences 
between cards are usually minimal, especially considering that none of the terms are 
ever binding and can be altered at any time by the issuer. He argues that customers 
tend to overestimate the value of rewards programs, and often borrow more than they 
otherwise would because of the perceived benefits.219 Regardless of the "unique" 
identifier on the face of the card, behind each one lies a boilerplate agreement that, 
Mann argues, "even the most sophisticated cardholder could not master."220
Staples calls credit cards "the functional equivalent" of a "national 
identification card." Police use it as a paper trail to track people's whereabouts and 
habits and corporations "sort" people (much like goods).221 Personal information 
from commercial sources has at times been notoriously easy to access. In an expose 
on the vulnerability of personal privacy written in 1992, Jeffrey Rothfeder described 
his relative ease in obtaining private information on well-known individuals through 
the aid of consumer data bureaus. He was able to purchase the social security 
number, unlisted addresses and phone number, credit report and bank information of 
the sitting Vice President, Dan Quayle, among numerous others. "[PJeople," 
Rothfeder concluded, "are at the whim of...large organizations—direct marketers, the 
credit bureaus, the government, and the entire information economy—that view
218 Ethnic identity has been integral to marketing at least since the 1970s; See Marilyn Halter, Shopping 
fo r  Identity: The Marketing o f  Ethnicity (New York: Schocken, 2000).
219 Mann, 167.
220 Ibid., 5.
221 Staples, 84-85.
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individuals as nothing but lifeless data floating like microscopic entities in vast 
electronic chambers...to be captured, examined, collated, and sold..."222 Safeguards to 
privacy and "identity protection" exist to some degree and are continually changing. 
One might not be able to buy Vice President Dick Cheney's credit report today, but 
vast quantities of individuals' private information continue to be tracked, collated, and 
exchanged in vast quantities.
Credit cards play a critical role in political elections, and not just as a means 
for online political contributions. Political data companies use "microtargeting" by 
collecting consumer information from potential voters, largely provided by credit 
card companies. That people who drink Dr. Pepper tend to vote Republican and 
Volvo owners tend to vote Democrat helps political parties implement targeted 
campaign messages. Voter Vault is the Republic Party's version of Axciom and the 
Democratic National Committee runs Datamart/Demzilla. The databases each 
essentially work the same. All of the nation's registered voters are in the database 
along with identifying information such as party affiliation, consumer data, voting 
characteristics of their precinct, and census information.223 The data is used to 
personalize campaign appeals according to a voter's identity or values. Some may 
argue, however, that the most effective vote is with dollars. As Hank Steuver opined
222 Jeffrey Rothfeder, Privacy For Sale: H ow Computerization has Made Everyone's Private Life an 
Open Secret (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 30.
223 Scott Eden, "Democrats Unleash 'Demzilla' on the GOP," Business Intelligence Pipeline (Aug 24, 
2004), http://plusthree.com/about/news/headlines/20040824_demzilla/ (accessed May 14, 2008).
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in the Washington Post Magazine in 2002, "Consumer spending is the last way you 
can feel like an American with any sway in the national outcome. "224
Surveillance on the ground in Wilmington or through the technology of 
consumer credit is democratic in the sense that nearly everyone falls under its gaze 
indiscriminately. Yet the acquisition of knowledge itself can be an implementation of 
power and the one-sidedness of the watching eye renders everyone who is watched 
vulnerable and voiceless. This phenomena is hardly unique to Wilmington or the 
credit industry. We live in what Staples calls a "culture of surveillance" and a "state 
of permanent visibility."225 The surveillance efforts may seem to serve a variety of 
purposes from preventing crime to promoting a product, but Torin Monahan asserts 
that "surveillance and security are important components of emerging neoliberal 
sensibilities and structures."226 The surveillance culture may not encompass a single 
ideology, but it tends to work toward or through so-called "free" market enterprise. 
The "sensibility" Monahan references includes the consumerism model promoted by 
niche-marketing that utilizes purchase patterns through an individual's credit card. It 
also includes the promotion of the thriving business in downtown Wilmington. 
Monahan's notion of surveillance as a component of neoliberal "structure" includes 
the multi-tiered security system in Wilmington that emerged from public and private
224 Hank Steuver, "Just One Word: Plastic," The Washington P ost Magazine, June 16, 2002, W14.
225 Staples, 4, 10.
226 Monahan, 9.
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partnerships. The security operation in Rodney Square is an example of "the vast 
profits that private companies stand to accrue at public expense."227
227 Monahan, 15.
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CONCLUSION
The Delaware legislature's implementation of a largely unrestricted market for 
the banking industry typifies the neoliberalism experienced across the nation and 
globally in the 1980s. Neoliberalism is the belief that the state's primary purpose is 
to facilitate free enterprise. It is at the heart of Senator Martin's questions during the 
hearings: "Aren't we coming down to the basic question of if you believe in a 
controlled economy [or] one that's [a] so-called free marketplace?"228 The question 
asks whether you believe that the state should exert control over economic activity— 
laws such as limitations on how much a credit card company can charge its 
customers—or whether the state should enable business to set its own norms, in other 
words interest rates should be set according to what the market will bear. Neoliberals 
believe that, "human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized 
by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade."229 State controls such 
as usury limits are believed to inhibit economic growth.230 When Governor du Pont 
said the FCDA was, "a natural response to the changes occurring on the national level 
in the banking industry," he was referring to the growing trend towards neoliberal
228 House Hearings cd.
229 David Harvey, A B rief H istory o f  N eoliberalism  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2.
230 Ibid., 11.
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theory in the marketplace.231 And yet the passage of the law did not happen through 
the "nature" or character of the market, but through the aid of the legislative body.
Critics of neoliberal enterprise have argued that an unconstrained market does 
not benefit the social good, but increases the disparity between rich and poor. David 
Harvey calls the wealth achieved in a neoliberal "free" marketplace "accumulation by 
dispossession." Those that benefit, such as the credit card companies, do so at the 
expense of others. Harvey argues that common results of enterprise under 
neoliberalism are environmental degradation, social inequality, and a reaffirmation of 
class power.232 The critics of the results of the FCDA, Hornstein, Atkins, Allen, and 
Peterson, would contend that these are precisely the costs paid by residents of 
Wilmington and Delaware.
Harvey has termed the banking and the financial services industry "primary 
players" in neoliberal policy implementation. The passage of the FCDA, a law 
written by the banks for the banks and supported by the Delaware legislature is a 
prime example of the financial industry implementing—literally writing into law— 
neoliberal policy. Far from being an isolated event, the passage of the FCDA was 
reflective of worldwide economic trends.
Harvey argues that although neoliberal enterprise espouses the belief in a lack 
of government regulation, it "cannot function without a strong state and strong market
231 Untitled type-written speech, Governor's papers, du Pont Administration, Delaware State Archives, 
p. 7.
232 Harvey, 122.
81
and legal institutions."233 The risk shift occurred not because the government 
withdrew from the marketplace, but rather because lawmakers actively wrote 
legislation to favor corporate institutions over consumers. Corporate entities, in this 
case Chase Manhattan and Morgan Guaranty, lobbied for a deliberate substantiation 
of an institutional framework that would buoy their bottom line. The supplanting of 
corporate banking interests in Wilmington was enforced and reified in the structure, 
architecture, and surveillance that the institutions spawned.
As of this writing, the U.S. is struggling with a crisis in the real estate market 
that has contributed to an economic downturn that some argue is currently or may 
soon become a recession. Subprime home mortgages, loans with steep penalties and 
interest-rate increases that are given to what banks consider high-risk borrowers, have 
come under scrutiny after the collapse of several financial institutions that back 
them.234 Subprime mortgages often initiate a few years of low interest rates before 
making a substantial leap, which can render monthly payments unmanageable. 
Housing foreclosures reached a record high in the fourth quarter of last year.235 Steep 
fees and pre-payment penalties are other characteristics of subprime loans. Subprime 
lenders and mortgage brokers are considered "predatory" when they target vulnerable 
communities, mislead borrowers or saddle them with mortgages that they are unlikely
233 Harvey, 117.
234 Paul Tustain, "Subprime mortgage collapse: why Bear Stearns is just the start," M oney Week, March 
2008, http://www.moneyweek.com/file/31699/subprime-mortgage-collapse-why-bear-stearns-is-just- 
the-start.html (accessed May 14, 2008).
235 Housing foreclosures have been tracked since 1978. Janet Whitman, N ational Post's Financial 
Post & FP Investing, March 7, 2008, Financial Post, FP1.
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to be able to repay.236 The credit card industry uses many similar tactics on its
customers.
Just as homeowners defaulted on their mortgage payments in increasing 
numbers, credit card companies sent more offers directly to those customers.237 The 
greatest profit in consumer credit arises from late fees and interest on large balances, 
and people in the midst of losing their homes are likely to oblige.238 As Hacker 
describes in The Great Risk Shift, in the absence of economic safety nets people often 
turn to credit cards. Defaults on credit cards are at a four-year high at present, which 
suggests the possibility that the consumer credit industry could be headed the way of 
the subprime mortgage sector.239
Wilmington has become an icon for the credit card industry. I have sought to 
tell the origin story of the city's entry into that market. Consumer debt plays a 
significant and troubling role in many Americans' lives. But it is not just individuals 
who suffer from insurmountable debt, there is also a social cost. As the subprime 
crisis has demonstrated, the country's fiscal health suffers from widespread individual
236 Other tactics include fees for unnecessary or non-existent services and encouraging borrowers to lie 
about their incom e on forms to obtain higher loans. "Predatory Lending," and " Don't Be-A Victim O f 
Loan Fraud," U .S. Department o f Housing and Urban Developm ent website, Homes and Communities 
page, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/pred/predlend.cfm (accessed May 14, 2008).
237 Robert Gavin, " Credit card companies woo struggling mortgage-holders," The Boston Globe, 
September 4, 2007, Metro. This is not the only instance o f  credit card companies targeting such 
customers. See Timothy Egan, "Newly Bankrupt Raking In Piles o f Credit Offers, N ew York Times, 
December 11, 2005, National.
238 Stephen Otto, "Was the Credit Industry Sincere in its Lobbying for Bankruptcy Reform?" 
Bankruptcy Law N etw ork , October 2, 2007, http://www.bankruptcylawnetwork.com/2007/10/02/was- 
the-credit-industry-sincere-in-its-lobbying-for-bankruptcy-reform/ (accessed May 14, 2008).
239 "U.S. credit card debt mounting," United Press International, May 9, 2008, Business, 
http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/Business/2008/05/09/us_credit_card_debt_mounting/2435/ (accessed  
May 14, 2008).
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economic collapse, which additionally has ramifications on the global economy. 
"Nearly everyone loses when consumers are mired in debt," Ronald Mann wrote in 
2006. "Credit card borrowing," he continued, "as it exists in the globalized West 
imposes substantial external costs on the economy, not internalized by the networks, 
issuers, or cardholders."240
Consumer credit can have a profound impact on people and communities and 
yet it is also an intangible, abstract entity. Debt is lack: money that one does not 
have. Credit allows people to buy time, to delay the payment for goods received. 
The location of the bank, the customer, and where the charge is made can be varied, 
fluid, and virtual. Credit issuing banks headquartered in Delaware solicit customers 
primarily out of state. Those out-of-state customers in turn conduct business under 
the laws of a state in which they cannot vote for the legislators who enact those laws. 
In concentrating on the local issues that led to the Delaware legislature's passage of 
the FCDA, my aim has been to concretize the very tangible elements and human 
interactions that enabled it. Wilmington, Delaware serves as a mere billing address 
for millions of credit card customers. Yet real buildings take up the space where time 
is sold. Real individuals live and work in and around that space. They are physical 
targets of the same surveillance sensibility that keeps constant watch over consumers' 
personal information and purchasing habits.
The city known for its introduction of DuPont plastics into our everyday lives 
supplanted that industry's dominance with corporations trafficking in a different kind
240 Mann, 4.
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of plastic: credit cards. Wilmington will continue to change in ways that cannot be 
predicted. In this sense too it is plastic: capable of taking new shape. Perhaps with 
increased cognizance of corporate usurpation of financial regulation, consumers can 
instigate the replacement of such laws with policy that seeks to remedy income 
inequity and embodies the ideology that "Someone is watching out for you"—but not 
via surveillance camera.241
241 Hacker, x.
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